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During the last twenty-five years, feminist activists and theorists have
transformed society's understanding of abuse against women by their
intimate partners. While creating the concepts of "battering"' and "battered
woman," 3 they have galvanized a broad and multilayered response to what
* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. My
colleagues in the clinical program at the Washington College of Law provided intellectual
sustenance, and also shared responsibility for the ongoing functioning of the clinical program.
Both made this project possible. I benefitted enormously from Alexandra Kutz's excellent
research assistance and Stephanie Fitts' unfailing administrative support.
i. Eve S. Buzawa & Carl F. Buzawa, Introduction to DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE vii-xxii (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl F. Buzawa eds.,
1992); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory
and Practice in Work on Woman-A buse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520 (1992).
2. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 1, at 535.
3. See id. at 529-30.
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is now commonly understood as the "problem of domestic violence."4
Within the legal sphere, they have created civil actions permitting remedies,
commonly known as civil protection orders, which enable women who have
been abused to obtain a broad range of temporary relief against their
abusers.' Feminist activists and theorists have also generated many
legislative and policy changes in the criminal law, which have resulted in
increased enforcement of generally applicable criminal laws to situations of
familial or intimate violence, the passage of specific laws addressing
domestic violence, such as mandatory arrest laws and laws making violation
of a civil protection order a crime, and the introduction of policies encourag-
ing or mandating prosecution when domestic violence has occurred.6 In the
torts area, they have successfully limited the application of spousal
immunity to permit the imposition of tort liability against an abuser for
damages resulting from domestic violence.' In addition, they have been
instrumental in bringing about the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,8
federal legislation that provides services, funding, judicial training, remedies
for immigrant women who have been abused, federal causes of action for
civil rights violations, and interstate enforcement of civil protection orders. 9
These legal developments have not only made the abuse of women a
visible object of legal regulation, but also brought women who have suffered
abuse into the judicial system.'0 Women who have been abused by their
intimate partners sometimes enter the legal world willingly, seeking
assistance or redress from the legal system for the abuse. They are
sometimes forced into that world unwillingly, either when actions are
4. See sources cited supra note 1.
5. KATHERINE T. BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMEN-
TARY 531-32 (1993); Gary R. Brown, Battered Women and the Temporary Restraining Order,
10 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 261 (1988); Peter Finn, Statutory Authority in the Use and
Enforcement of Civil Protection Orders Against Domestic Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 43 (1989)
(describing civil protection orders for domestic violence cases).
6. BARTLETT, supra note 5, at 530-31; Schneider, supra note 1, at 523-24.
7. Leonard Karp & Cheryl L. Karp, Family Violence, Conflict and Sexual A buse,
in DOMESTIC TORTS 5-73 (1989 & Supp. 1993); Douglas D. Scherer, Tort Remedies for
Victims of Domestic A buse, 43 S.C. L. REV. 543 (1992); Merle H. Weiner, Domestic
Violence and the Per Se Standard of Outrage, 54 MD. L. REV. 183 (1995); Rhonda L.
Kohler, Note, The Battered Woman and Tort Law: A New Approach to Fighting Domestic
Violence, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1025 (1992).
8. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
9. Julie Goldscheid et al., The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women
Act: Legislative History, Policy Implications & Litigation Strategy, A Panel Discussion
Sponsored by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, September 14, 1995, 1996
J.L. & POL'Y 383; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Introduction: The Promise of the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994, 1996 J.L. & POL'Y 371.
10. See generally Schneider, supra note 9.
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brought against them, such as murder or assault prosecutions or custody
actions, in which the violence against them is bound up in the action, or
when they are coerced into being reluctant participants in actions to
vindicate a social policy against domestic violence, most commonly criminal
prosecutions against an abuser. They may also enter the legal world
inadvertently, when the Violence against them is interwoven with some other
claim the women are making or defending, such as in actions regarding
disability benefits,"1 welfare benefits,
12 or unemployment compensation. 3
In many, although not all, of these actions, women who have been abused
are represented by a lawyer.
The relationship between the woman who has been abused and the
lawyer has increasingly become the focus of academic discussion and
debate. 4 Two related sets of theoretical questions intersect in framing this
discussion. First, feminist theorists and activists have begun to question the
increasingly dominant underlying vision of a "battered woman" and the
understanding of "battering" that have animated many of the legal changes
accomplished on behalf of women who have been abused. 5 Second, clinical
II. See, e.g., Linda G. Mills, A Calculus for Bias: How Malingering Females and
Dependent Housewives Fare in the Social Security Disability System, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 211, 227-28 (1993) (debating the objectivity of medical evidence in the Social Security
disability system).
12. See, e.g., Jody Raphael, Domestic Violence and Welfare Receipt: Toward a New
Feminist Theory of Welfare Dependency, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 201, 204-07 (1996)
(explaining how domestic violence can affect welfare recipients).
13. See, e.g., id.
14. Susan Bryant & Maria Arias, Case Study: A Battered Women's Rights Clinic:
Designing a Clinical Program Which Encourages a Problem-Solving Vision of Lawyering
that Empowers Clients and Community, 42 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 207 (1992);
Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal Narratives, Therapeutic Narratives: The Invisibility and
Omnipresence of Race and Gender, 95 MICH. L. REV. 901 (1997); Peter Margulies,
Representation of Domestic Violence Survivors as a New Paradigm of Poverty Law: In
Search of Access, Connection, and Voice, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1071 (1995); Joan S.
Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal Perspectives on
Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295 (1993); Linda G.
Mills, Intuition and Insight: A New Job Description for the Battered Woman 's Prosecutor and
Other More Modest Proposals, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 183 (1997) [hereinafter Mills,
Intuition]; Linda G. Mills, On the Other Side of Silence: Affective Lawyering for Intimate
A buse, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1225 (1996) [hereinafter Mills, Silence]; Kimberly E. O'Leary,
Creating Partnerships: Using Feminist Techniques to Enhance the Attorney-Client
Relationship, 16 LEGAL STUD. F. 207 (1992).
15. Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995); Naomi R. Cahn & Joan S. Meier, Domestic
Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence: Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 339,
353-61 (1995); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality. Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); Phyllis Goldfarb,
Describing Without Circumscribing: Questioning the Construction of Gender in the Discourse
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scholars and others who train lawyers to represent women who have been
abused have begun to examine how the relationship between lawyer and
client affects the experiences of these women in the legal system.
6
In this article, I will discuss the two theoretical frameworks prompting
a re-examination of legal representation for women who have been abused
and the implications of these critiques for both the education of lawyers
representing women who have been abused and our conceptualization of the
process of developing theory regarding the meaning of the legal system for
these women. First, I will identify the main elements of the emerging
feminist critique of the ascendant conception of domestic violence that
underlies many of the legal reforms accomplished during the last quarter
century for women who have been abused. Second, I will examine the
principal themes in the attempts by theorists of legal practice to articulate
a vision of lawyering on behalf of women who have been abused. Third,
I will examine the roles of theory and experience in educating students to
provide representation to women who have been abused. Based on the
analysis of theory and experience, I will discuss ways to approach the
education of lawyers to provide representation to women who have been
abused which not only address domestic violence from the perspectives of
those women, but also contribute to our developing understanding of abuse
in the lives of women.
I. FEMINIST CRITIQUES OF THE "BATTERED WOMAN" AND "BATTERING"
Without rejecting the importance of many of the cultural, social,
political and legal developments of the last quarter century, or the recogni-
tion of the oppression of women underlying the efforts to secure these
changes, some feminist theorists and activists have identified limitations,
contradictions and dangers embedded in the theoretical constructs that have
dominated both the discourse about, and the institutional developments
affecting, the experience of abused women in an intimate relationship. 7
They have seen the harms women who have been abused suffer under the
legal regime resulting from the changes that have been implemented, and
confronted the conceptual problems revealed in the actualization of the new
of Intimate Violence, 64 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 582 (1996); Christine A. Littleton, Women's
Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23; Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining
the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991); Schneider, supra note I, at 529-39.
16. Margulies, supra note 14, at 1092-1103; Meier, supra note 14, at 1332-56; Mills,
Silence, supra note 14, at 1228-31; O'Leary, supra note 14, at 213-15.
17. Abrams, supra note 15, at 368-76; Cahn & Meier, supra note 15, at 340, 353-56,
358, 359; Goldfarb, supra note 15, at 589-96, 600-01; Mahoney, supra note 15, at 75-79;




legal landscape." Against this background, these feminist theorists and
activists have begun to articulate new ways to conceive and approach the
issue of abuse of women in intimate relationships." Although not all of
those who have engaged in this critique embrace all of the following
elements, several overlapping and intersecting themes characterize this
emerging feminist critique.
First, these theorists see the construct of the "battered woman" as
essentializing. ° It makes one characteristic of a woman's experience define
her entire identity, thereby marginalizing or trivializing other aspects of her
identity.2I Those aspects of her life that she may have insulated from the
impact of the violence in her life become invisible. 2  Her strengths and her
accomplishments become submerged under the label of "battered woman."23
Her relationship with a violent person entirely defines her.24
Second, these critics also view the construct of "battering" as
essentializing because this framework treats intimate abuse as a single,
uniform experience.2" Within dominant theories of domestic violence, the
"cycle of violence" is presented as having a powerful, internal dynamic that,
of necessity, replicates itself in all battered women's lives.26 Experiences
that do not fit into the cycle are denied, diminished, or interpreted to make
them fit into the model.27 If a woman's experience does not fit the cycle,
it must not be "battering., 28  In addition, this view of "battering" is
constructed out of the experiences of primarily white, heterosexual women.29
18. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
19. See generally sources cited supra notes 14 and 15.
20. Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. L.J. 2475, 2487-88 (1993);
Mahoney, supra note 15, at 24-26; Schneider, supra note 1, at 530.




25. Goldfarb, supra note 15, at 619-21; Littleton, supra note 15, at 29-30; Schneider,
supra note 1, at 531, 535-39.
26. See Mahoney, supra note 15, at 2-10.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 17-19.
29. Abrams, supra note 15, at 334-37; Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies,
Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-A merican Woman and the Battered
Woman Syndrome, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 1003, 1006; Cahn & Meier, supra note 15, at 357-59;
Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1241-44; Espinoza, supra note 14, at 909-1 I, 931-32; Goldfarb,
supra note 15, at 588, 597, 601-02; Nilda Rimonte, A Question of Culture: Cultural Approval
of Violence Against Women in the Pacific-Asian Community and the Cultural Defense, 43
STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1322 (1991); Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by
Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 231, 233 (1994); Schneider, supra note 1, at 531-34; Gloria Valencia-
Weber & Christine P. Zuni, Domestic Violence and Tribal Protection of Indigenous Women
in the United States, 69 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 69 (1995); Karin Wang, Battered Asian
10231997]
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"Battering" of women of color or of lesbians is understood as a variant of
the dominant model.3" Their experiences of intimate abuse and their
understanding of those experiences are not used to alter the model or to
challenge its validity, but are assimilated into it.3
Third, "battered women" are portrayed as victims, as powerless and
passive objects of another's violence, helpless to free themselves from the
constraints imposed by the "batterer., 32 Women whose actions seem to fit
into the stereotypical portrait are denied affirmation of their attempts to
resist, to survive, to protect their children, or to create space to maneuver
within the constraints they face.33 The reasonableness of the choices made
within the constraints they face is obliterated.34 In addition, the stereotype
of "battered women" as passive victims might secure them help or
protection in one context, but may boomerang to harm them in another.35
A merican Women: Community Responses from the Battered Women's Movement and the
Asian American Community, 3 ASIAN L.J. 151 (1996); James W. Zion & Elsie B. Zion,
Hozho' Sokee '--Stay Together Nicely: Domestic Violence Under Navajo Common Law, 25
ARIz. ST. L.J. 407 (1993). See generally, Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585-615 (1990) (suggesting that gender
essentialism should be abandoned).
30. See Mahoney, supra note 15, at 8-9.
31. See Abrams, supra note 15, at 334-37; Goldfarb, supra note 15, at 619-21;
Schneider, supra note 1, at 531-35.
32. Abrams, supra note 15, at 344-45, 375-76; Littleton, supra note 15, at 29-30, 42-
43; Mahoney, supra note 15, at 38-40; Kristian Miccio, In the Name of Mothers and
Children: Deconstracting the Myth of the Passive Battered Mother and the "Protected Child"
in Child Neglect Proceedings, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1087, 1099-1100 (1995); Schneider, supra
note I, at 529-31; see also Cahn & Meier, supra note 15, at 353-55 (analyzing the pros and
cons of the theory of "learned helplessness").
33. Miccio, supra note 32, at 1100-01.
34. Id.
35. For example, women who have been abused may lose custody of their children
because they are seen as too passive to act as responsible parents. Abrams, supra note 15,
at 344-45; Mary E. Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: Social
Support Systems, Custody Outcomes, and Liability for Acts of Others, 2 U. CHI. L. ScH.
ROUNDTABLE 13, 14-16 (1995); Naomi Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact
of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1064-68 (1991);
Linda J. Panko, Legal Backlash: The Expanding Liability of Women Who Fail to Protect
Their Children from Their Male Panner's Abuse, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 67, 87 (1995);
see also Jane Harris Aiken, Intimate Violence and the Problem of Consent, 48. S.C. L. REV.
615, 626-27 (1997) (explaining how leaving an abusive situation can be used as evidence of
instability and unfitness in custody hearings).
Women may also have their children removed from their care due to a failure to protect
the children from abuse or from witnessing the mother's abuse. Becker, supra note 35, at
13-16, 20-21; Miccio, supra note 32, at 1089-90, 1101-02; Panko, supra note 35, at 67-69;
Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive
Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 992, 994-95 (1995).
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Other women, whose actions challenge the stereotypical portrait, who wish
to assert their capacity to shape or control the violent situation in some way,
are often left outside of the sphere of protection offered by the legal
developments regarding domestic violence.36
Fourth, the power of the construct of the "battered woman" tends to put
the focus on the woman, rather than the man who is violent.37 This focus
has two consequences. First, the common question asked about abused
women is "Why didn't she leave?" This question tends to obscure the
inquiry about why she had to face the violence at all." Second, the twin
constructs of "battering" and "battered woman" are dependent upon the
demonization of the "batterer." Seen solely as the instrument or incarnation
of violence, he is rarely a real, complex human being for whom a woman
might have felt or still feel affection.39 When differences among men who
abuse women are minimized or the complexities of a particular woman's
history with a man are invisible, women's differential responses to varying
situations are more difficult to comprehend." Therefore, women's efforts
to find help for or to protect the person who has abused them are under-
stood, at best, as misguided and, at worst, as demented.4 Other women's
efforts to protect their children's relationship with a parent who may be
36. Abrams, supra note 15, at 334-35, 368-74 (noting the disenfranchisement of Black
women); Goldfarb, supra note 15, at 625-26; see also Stark, supra note 35, at 1012-14
(showing one woman's aggressiveness in court which did not fit the stereotype of a passive
victim).
37. See Abrams, supra note 15, at 325-29; Becker, supra note 35, at 15, 27
(describing the cultural tendency to blame mothers); Littleton, supra note 15, at 38; Mahoney,
supra note 15, at 25-26; Peter Margulies, The Violence of Law and Violence Against
Women, 8 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 179, 186 (1996); Meier, supra note 14, at
1311; Panko, supra note 35, at 85-86 (noting society's tendency to blame the woman who
has been abused); Schneider, supra note 1, at 530; cf Cahn & Meier, supra note 15, at 344-
45 (enumerating the frequency of women's victimization by domestic violence).
38. See Becker, supra note 35, at 18-19; Cahn & Meier, supra note 15, at 343-45;
Littleton, supra note 15, at 43-47, 52-56; Mahoney, supra note 15, at 5-7; Panko, supra note
35, at 85-86 (emphasizing the actions of the violent man as opposed to the actions of the
"battered woman"); Schneider, supra note 1, at 557-59; see also Lucie E. White, No Exit:
Rethinking "Welfare Dependency "from a Different Ground, 81 GEO. L.J. 1961, 1987-88
(1993) (describing a past welfare recipient who stayed in an abusive situation to hold the
marriage together).
39. Becker, supra note 35, at 17-18; Cahn, supra note 20, at 2490; Cahn & Meier,
supra note 15, at 344, 355-56; Espinoza, supra note 14, at 906-07 (describing one woman's
difficulty separating herself from her abuser); Peter Margulies, Political Lawyering. One
Person at a Time: The Challenge of Legal Work Against Domestic Violence for the Impact
Litigation/Client Service Debate, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 493, 504-05 (1996) (illustrating
the affectionate feelings that "battered women" may still have for their abusive men); Mills,
Intuition, supra note 14, at 184-85 (describing the occasional abuser).
40. Mahoney, supra note 15, at 34-43.
41. Id.
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loving, or, at least adequate, by staying in an abusive situation or resisting
punishment of an abusive partner are demeaned, ignored, or treated as
irrational.42
Fifth, these four characteristics of the concepts of "battering" and
"battered woman" lead many women not to recognize themselves or their
experiences in the standard narrative of domestic violence.43 In order to
secure what legal protections exist, they often must violate their own
understanding of themselves and conform to the dominant stereotype.44 In
making this strategic maneuver, a woman can feel additional powerlessness
at her inability to explain her own situation as she experienced it. If she
refuses to participate in this violation of her self-understanding, a woman
may forego the limited protections that the legal system offers. She may
decide to withdraw from the legal system that seems to demand adherence
to the stereotype, incurring the wrath or the pity of many participants in that
system. She may even end up jailed or punished for failing to play her
appointed role. Alternatively, if she proceeds in the legal system but refuses
to adopt the standard story, she may find herself denied the protection that
she sought.
Sixth, using legal remedies may create additional dangers for women
who have been abused rather than ensuring or even increasing their safety
or the safety of their children.45 This feminist critique is directed not just
at the partial nature of most legal tools, but also at the site of the decision
about whether to use available legal mechanisms. Beyond the debates about
whether or not civil protection orders, arrests, criminal prosecutions and
incarceration actually decrease the incidence or level of violence in the
aggregate,46 these critics are concerned that those who work with or counsel
42. Id.
43. Id. at 8-9, 15-18, 25-26; Mills, Intuition, supra note 14, at 187 (explaining
women's resistance to being labeled as "battered women"); Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at
1226; Schneider, supra note 1, at 530-31; see also Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil
Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603,
1630 (1989) (explaining in a useful way the idea of an "'approved' repertoire of stories and
arguments and storytelling and argument-making practices").
44. See Goldfarb, supra note 15, at 625-26; Mahoney, supra note 15, at 16-17
(detailing the lack of protection within the legal system and the further victimization that
women suffer due to the current legal system); Margulies, supra note 37, at 183; see also
Jane C. Murphy, Lawyenng for Social Change: The Power of the Narutive in Domestic
Violence Law Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243 (1993) (supporting the idea of telling
individual stories to reintroduce the "human experience" into lawmaking).
45. Becker, supra note 35, at 14-15, 18-19, 22-23, 26-27; Cahn, supra note 20, at
2490 (describing the possibility of "battered women" losing custody of children to and having
protection orders violated by battering men); Mahoney, supra note 15, at 44-47; Mills,
Silence, supra note 14, at 1234; Panko, supra note 35, at 87.
46. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in
Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1850 (1996); Mills, Intuition, supra note
1026 [Vol. 64:1019
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the women, initiate legal actions, or make decisions in those cases disregard
and belittle an individual woman's evaluation of the danger she or her
children face when she participates in legal action.47
These feminist theorists and activists seek first to reveal and challenge
the assumptions behind and consequences of legal reforms, many of which
they themselves originally sought.4 Second, they attempt to place these
reforms in a historical and political perspective, in order to further our
understanding of how visions implicit in legal reforms may not be apparent
until those reforms are realized and how the consequences of legal change
may not be predictable or intended.49 Third, these theorists and activists are
engaged in a search for new legal strategies that provide abused women with
legal accounts of abuse by an intimate partner that resonate with their own
experiences, that create additional space for safely challenging that abuse,
and that do not separate social policies regarding domestic violence from the
complex and multiple realities of women who must find ways to cope with
violence in their intimate relationships.
II. THEORIES OF REPRESENTATION FOR WOMEN WHO
HAVE BEEN ABUSED
Scholars who teach students in their clinical courses to provide
representation to clients, including women who are abused by intimate
partners, confront, in multiple aspects of their students' representation, the
images of "battering" and "battered women" that are so troubling to the
emerging feminist critique of the now dominant domestic violence narra-
tives. These images appear in the students' own implicit or explicit
understanding of domestic violence, in the attitudes and behavior ofjudges,
opposing counsel, witnesses, police, prosecutors, court clerks, family
members, friends, social service providers, and other participants in the legal
system. Faced with these images, clinical theorists have begun to articulate
and teach a vision of the lawyer-client relationship, in which the lawyer
14, at 188-91 (supplying. differing views about the effectiveness and safety of having
mandatory or preferred arrest policies); Symposium on Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1992); Angela Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of
Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L.
REV. 853 (1994).
47. Cynthia G. Bowman, The A rrest Experiments: A Feminist Critique, 83 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 201, 203-04 (1992); Bryant & Arias, supra note 14, at 221; Cahn, supra
note 20, at 2488; Cahn & Meier, supra note 15, at 351-54; Littleton, supra note 15, at 36-37,
45-46; Mahoney, supra note 15, at 47-49; Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1234; Stark, supra
note 35, at 1014.
48. See generally Bryant & Arias, supra note 14; Cahn, supra note 20; Cahn & Meier,
supra note 15; Mahoney, supra note 17; Mills, Silence, supra note 16.
49. See Abrams, supra note 15, at 325-29, 344-46 (analyzing the consequences of
dominance feminism).
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works with the client to create an experience for the client in the legal
system in which the woman can both learn about and make decisions about
ways to use the legal system, including bypassing the system entirely, in the
process of defining and meeting her needs.
Several theorists of practice have identified elements that they think are
essential to effective representation of women who have been abused.0
Although these various efforts to create models of representation for women
who have been abused have differences, certain recurring characteristics
emerge from these models. Identifying. these characteristics can be helpful
in increasing our awareness of the assumptions we bring to representation
for women who have been abused, evaluating our emerging conceptions of
this representation, fashioning alternative models, identifying lawyering
practices through which the models can be realized, and exploring
pedagogical methods that would enable students to learn how to provide and
critique the practices that the aspirational models describe.
In different ways, these theorists of practice are particularly attentive to
the affective components of the lawyer-client relationship. Two of them,
Peter Margulies and Linda Mills, have explicitly characterized their models
as "affective." 5' A third, Leslie Espinoza, has characterized hers as
"therapeutic." 2 A fourth, Joan Meier, in the creation of a model integrating
both legal and psychological theory and practice, has made the affective
component central to her vision of lawyering.13 Finally, while Susan Bryant
and Maria Arias are deeply concerned about making a client's understanding
of her situation and definition of her needs a critical component in the
interaction between lawyer and client, they also stress the importance of
other aspects of client representation.' Some, but not all, of these
developing models of lawyering for women who have been abused in an
intimate relationship are deeply rooted in and draw heavily upon psychologi-
cal theory."
50. Bryant & Arias, supra note 14, at 215-16 (interviewing skills); Espinoza, supra
note 14, at 908-09 (lawyer putting client's story in the context of the client's personal
history); Margulies, supra note 14, at 1092-1103 (domestic violence survivors' access to,
connection with, and voice in the system); Margulies, supra note 39, at 496, 506-07
(discussing the emotional requirements); Meier, supra note 14,.at 1328-37, 1363-66; Mills,
Silence, supra note 14, at 1240-48, 1257-60.
51. Margulies, supra note 14, at 1072-74; Mills, Intuition, supra note 14, at 192;
Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1228-31, 1257-60.
52. Espinoza, supra note 14, at 936-37.
53. Meier, supra note 14, at 1322-24, 1332-49.
54. Bryant & Arias, supra note 14, at 213, 218-21.
55. Linda Mills is a lawyer, a social worker and a professor of Social Welfare at the
School of Public Policy and Social Research at the University of California at Los Angeles,
where she teaches both social workers and lawyers. Joan Meier, a lawyer and a law
professor, has developed her model of representation in collaboration with Mary Ann Dutton,
a clinical psychologist. Meier, supra note 14, at 1296-99; Mills, Intuition, supra note 14, at
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A. Reflection on Experience
First, these models of lawyering encourage lawyers representing women
who have been abused to identify and reflect upon, both before and during
their representation, their own experiences of and feelings about violence or
powerlessness in intimate relationships. 6 This reflection is needed for three
interrelated reasons. First, understanding his or her own vulnerability and
powerlessness within intimate relationships is part of a lawyer's ability to
experience empathy with the client's situation." Although the lawyer may
197-98; Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1227-3 1. The Espinoza model is rooted in narrative
theory, Espinoza, supra note 14, at 936, and the Bryant and Arias model grows out of a
conception of public interest law practice. Bryant & Arias, supra note 14, at 218-21.
56. See Bryant & Arias, supra note 14, at 218-21; Espinoza, supra note 14, at 936-40.
57. Linda Mills has described the importance of the "mutual recognition of distinctly
similar, yet uniquely different, emotions" in the lawyer-client relationship. Mills, Silence,
supra note 14, at 1228-29. For Mills, advocacy for abused women in an intimate relationship
is dependent on lawyers' "ability to feel their own impotence in the subtext of their own
relational worlds, and on their capacity to acknowledge their powerlessness in the face of
lovers, supervisors, opposing counsel, or judges more powerful or seemingly more persuasive
than themselves." Id. From this reflection on their own experiences, lawyers can become
"both cognizant of the differences between themselves and their clients, their own abuse, and
the abuse of the battered women before them, and simultaneously capable of finding the
shared ground, or space in between, that is, the similarities of the violence they have both
endured, which serves to bridge the differences between them." Id. at 1229; see also Cahn
& Meier, supra note 15, at 345-46; Margulies, supra note 14, at 1094-98; Meier, supra note
14, at 1333-37; Mills, Intuition, supra note 14, at 197-98; Ann Shalleck, Clinical Contexts:
Theory and Practice in Law and Supervision, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 109, 176-
77 (1993-1994).
There is a rich literature on and debates about the meaning and uses of empathy within
the lawyer-client relationship within the general clinical literature. See, e.g., ROBERT M.
BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS
FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 116-26, 129, 265, 281 (1990); DAVID A. BINDER ET AL.,
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS 40-42, 47, 53, 234, 240-41, 244, 248, 303, 345, 348, 351, 355-57,
360 (1991); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement,
32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 551, 571, 573 (1990); Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 991 (1992) [hereinafter Ellmann, Empathy & Approval]; Stephen Ellmann,
The Ethic of Care as an EthicforLawyes, 81 GEO. L.J. 2665, 2698-2702 (1993) [hereinafter
Ellmann, Ethic of Care]; Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717,
734-39 (1987) [hereinafter Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients]; Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes
to Law School: The Clinical Education of the Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. I, 45-50 (1993); Lucie E. White, Seeking . The Faces of Otherness
A Response to Professors Sarat, Felstiner, and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1499
(1992).
Also, within the literature about the nature of law, several legal scholars from different
theoretical perspectives have debated the importance of empathy. See, e.g., Lynne N.
Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987); Toni M. Massaro,
Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Wonis, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L.
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not have gone through the same type of experience as the client, the lawyer
needs to find within his or her own experience a basis for beginning to
understand the situation of a client on an emotional level.s For these
theorists, the discovery of common experiential ground is necessary, not
primarily for instrumental reasons of gaining the trust of or increasing
rapport with a client, but for the construction of a relationship built
explicitly on the shared recognition of the similarities and differences in
their situations.59 From a relationship characterized by this sort of
understanding comes the lawyer's abilities to act effectively with and for the
client.
For these theorists, self-reflection is important for more than empathic
understanding, however. Reflection by the lawyer on his or her experiences
is part of the process of understanding the pervasive nature and complex
dynamics of intimate violence.' The lawyer needs to see intimate abuse not
as a single category within which one fits or not, but as a complex mixture
of experiences involving not just physical violence, but also coercive
behavior and the exercise of power and control," as well as other, yet
unnamed, forms of domination and dependency. From this identification of
commonalities of experience, lawyers can see that abuse is not a problem
of the "other," but a shared experience, even if the experience is different.62
REV. 2099 (1989); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to
Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1271-72 (1993).
58. Linda Mills has stressed that lawyers must undertake this self-reflection in order
to understand their clients "not intellectually or ideologically, but rather, through their
personal experiences of strength and weakness, passion and melancholy, distance and
deprivation in all facets of their lives." Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1228; see Ellmann,
Ethic of Care, supra note 57, at 2700; Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics
of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MiNN. L. REV. 1599, 1669 (1991) ("Feelings often
provide windows to thought, and analyzing the causes and consequences of particular
affective reactions often is a valuable step toward comprehending experience."); Henderson,
supra note 57, at 1579-82; Mills, Intuition, supra note 14, at 197-98.
59. Meier, supra note 14, at 1334; Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1228-29, 1258-
60; see also Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, supra note 57 (describing lawyering in which
lawyer and client share common concerns and goals); Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, supra
note 57, at 734-39. See generally other sources cited supra note 57 concerning the debates
about the uses of empathy within the lawyer-client relationship. Cf Margulies, supra note
14, at 1096-98 (advocating use of empathy as an instrumental technique).
60. Mills, Intuition, supra note 14, at 197-98; Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1228-
30.
61. See Abrams, supra note 15, at 344-46, 368-69; Mahoney, supra note 15, at 53-60;
Meier, supra note 14, at 1317-22; Schneider, supra note I, at 538; Stark, supra note 35, at
985-86 (exploring issues of power and control).
62. Mahoney, supra note 15, at 10-19; Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1258-60; see
also Jane M. Spinak, Reflections on a Case (of Motherhood), 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1990, 2049
(1995) (discussing "otherness" in a foster parent case); White, supra note 57, at 1508-09
(identifying the paradoxical nature of empathy-while we catalogue similarities with the
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Within these models, reflection by the lawyer furthers a third goal.
Only with reflection can the lawyer respond respectfully to both the client's
understanding of, and the decision-making affecting, her life.63 Lawyers
must confront and overcome any barriers in their own reactions to and
understanding of a client that could prompt them to disregard or overwhelm
a client's own thoughts and decisions about how to proceed in a case.'
other, we must also recognize the uniqueness of the other).
63. It is not clear within the affective lawyering literature whether the lawyer should
have a non-judgmental or respectful attitude toward the client. These two attitudes overlap
in many ways, but one can easily imagine scenarios in which a lawyer could have one
attitude and not the other. See Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, supra note 57, for an
insightful discussion of how expressions of empathy may reflect or communicate a positive
judgment. For Ellmann, these positive judgments "need not always remain so veiled." Id.
at 993. They are not only less problematic than they have generally been viewed within
standard clinical literature, but also can contribute to good lawyer-client relationships. Id
at 1014-15; see BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 57, at 116; BINDER ET AL., supra note
57, at 40, 53, 60-61. A similar instability seems to characterize the relationship between
withholding judgments about and having respect for the client's understanding and choices.
See BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 57, at 130; Bryant & Arias, supra note 14, at 219;
Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, supra note 57, at 997-1000.
64. See Shalleck, supra note 57, at 153-54 (discussing effects of student lawyers'
preconceptions about domestic violence on representation).
There is an extensive clinical literature on the imposition of lawyers' values and
perspectives on disempowered clients. Much of it has come from the scholarship described
as the "theoretics of practice" or "political lawyering" literature. See, e.g., GERALD LOPEZ,
REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769 (1992);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEo L.J. 2567 (1993); Anthony V. Alfieri,
Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J.
2107 (1991) [hereinafter Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty]; Anthony V. Alfieri, The
Antinomies of Poverty Law and A Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 659 (1987-1988); Peggy C. Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism: A
Demonstration Exploring Hierarchy and 'Feminine"Style, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1635 (1991);
Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 971
(1992); Ellmann, Ethic of Care, supra note 57; Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers:
Developing a Clinical Perspective on Critical Legal Theory, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992);
Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory,
93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994); Austin Sarat, " . . The Law is A11 Over:" Power, Resistance,
and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990); Ann
Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1731 (1993);
Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to
Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535 (1987-1988); Lucie E. White, Paradox,
Piece-Work, and Patience, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1992) [hereinafter White, Paradox]; Lucie
E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing
of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1990) [hereinafter White, Subordination].
In addition, the standard clinical literature on lawyering places great weight on lawyers'
facilitating a decision-making process rooted in the client's own values. David Binder and
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For these theorists, the lawyer's ability to not impose his or her own
assumptions, ways of thinking, stereotypes, or biases on a client is grounded
in reflection on the lawyer's own experience. 65 A lawyer's views of and
feelings about intimate abuse cannot just be left outside the door to the
lawyer's office. A lawyer can "shed" those attitudes only by reaching into
his or her own experience and finding commonalities, as well as differences,
with the client. The lawyer, by appreciating, or at least sensing, the ways
in which he or she shares in the vulnerabilities of the client, even if their
experiences have been different, may avoid judging the client.66 As the
lawyer perhaps becomes increasingly uncertain about what he or she would
have done if in the client's situation, the lawyer becomes less likely to
impose on a client a course of action that arises from the lawyer's
imposition of his or her own framework of understanding on the client.67
As with the development of empathy, the process of not judging a client
is a part of understanding the nature of intimate violence. For these
theorists, the uni-dimensional conception of "battering" within the dominant
theories of domestic violence has masked the complexities and contradic-
tions of the interactional structures within which intimate violence occurs.68
It has permitted and even encouraged participants in all parts of the legal
system to judge harshly women who have experienced abuse.69 By failing
his .colleagues have called this approach "client-centered." See BINDER ET AL., supra note
57, at 18, 20-21, 259-86, 347-61; see also BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 57, at 256,
283-303, 319-23.
65. See Espinoza, supra note 14, at 912 (illustrating reflection on the lawyer's own
experience that assists the lawyer in understanding her client's experience of abuse).
66. For Mills and Meier, the process of reflection requires acknowledgment and
exploration of the countertransference that occurs between lawyer and client. See Meier,
supra note 14, at 1349-56; Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1246-48.
Other clinical theorists, not writing specifically about the representation of women who
have been abused in an intimate relationship, have also identified the importance of
recognizing the operation of countertransference in the lawyer-client relationship. See
BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 57, at 296-97.
67. White, supra note 57, at 1509.
68. See Espinoza, supra note 14, at 922-23, 925-30, 933-36 (discussing complex
issues in the lives of women who are abused that are hidden by dominant narratives of
abuse).
69. Panko, supra note 35, at 85-87; see Espinoza, supra note 14, at 926 (describing
how lawyer's judgment of client's approach to violence in her life prevented listening to
client's story); see also discussion supra Part I regarding the double binds created for women
who are identified as "battered." If they adopt the persona of the "battered woman," they
may receive help from the legal system in the form of protection orders, criminal sanctions
against an abuser, or acquittal for a retaliatory act on their part, but they may be penalized
for their "helplessness" in custody, child neglect or other legal actions against them. They
may suffer if they are coerced by the legal system into separation through the increased
danger they face in the future from the abuser. Their understanding of themselves and the
meaning of violence in their lives may be greatly damaged through their acquiescence in a
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to see and respect an individual woman's sometimes shifting and contradic-
tory ways of dealing with and interpreting the violence in her relationship,
a lawyer may easily impose his or her own understanding of the violence on
a client as the client makes the multiple decisions involved in taking any
legal action at all, including meeting with a lawyer. The lawyer can come
to understand the dynamics involved in continuing in an intimate relation-
ship in which there is abuse only if he or she accepts the conflicted and
unstable accounts that the woman has of her relationships and experiences.'
B. Recognition of the Fluidity of the Lawyer-Client Relationship
The second characteristic of these models of lawyering is their explicit
recognition of the fluidity of the lawyer-client relationship." A woman who
is or has been in an abusive relationship and has entered the legal system is
often in a long process of coming to understand the relationship and herself
within that relationship. As her understanding of the complex dynamics of
the relationship changes, and her vision of herself alters over time, she can
bring great instability to the relationship with her lawyer.72 In addition, the
relationship between the client and her lawyer can become an element
affecting her concepts of her life and herself.73 Therefore, the lawyer needs
to see his or her role not as furthering a stable goal of the client, but as
creating an opportunity for a client to explore multiple possibilities, as well
as her own changing desires to further any of them.74
picture of themselves that is in contradiction with their own sense of their lives. Alternative-
ly, if they insist on their own understanding of themselves and their relationships, they may
forego or be denied legal protections that may be of use to them. See also Abrams, supra
note 15, at 343-46, 362-67, for a full discussion of the dilemmas faced by women who
confront the legal system.
70. See Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman
Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1424-30 (1992) (identifying
the ambiguities of accounts and interpretations of domestic violence); Espinoza, supra note
14, at 908-09, 912-13 (describing the importance of creating a space for and listening to the
changing and contradictory stories of women who have been abused).
71. Espinoza, supra note 14, at 908-09, 911-12 (illustrating the uncertainty that exists
in the lawyer-client relationship of a domestic violence case); Meier, supra note 14, at 1343-
47; Mills, Intuition, supra note 14, at 191-92; Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1229-30,
1257-58.
72. Cahn, supra note 20, at 2475; Espinoza, supra note 14, at 911-14; Meier, supra
note 14, at 1343-47; Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1229-30, 1239.
73. William Simon has written insightfully about how a client does not come to the
lawyer-client relationship with fixed, stable needs, but throughout the relationship with the
lawyer and partly resulting from that relationship, engages in a process of formulating and
reformulating those needs. William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36
STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984).
74. See Espinoza, supra note 14, at 913-14 (describing the importance of a lawyer's
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The fluid character of the lawyer-client relationship, therefore, has two
components of particular importance for women who have been in abusive
relationships. First, it helps to affirrn within the process of representation
the non-judgmental attitude of the lawyer. If the woman can experience a
space within which she can examine multiple possibilities and shift among
them freely without fear of being judged as unstable or indecisive, she is
then better able to figure out, within the contours of that relationship, what
she thinks is best for her to do." If most people in the legal system are
telling her that she ought to leave, she has at least one place where the
desirability of leaving is not assumed and the complexities of separating are
acknowledged not just in words, but throughout the multiple aspects of the
lawyer-client interactions.
Second, by explicitly recognizing the unstable character of the client's
goal, the lawyer is better able to accept the seemingly non-instrumental
character of the representation.76 The purpose of the representation is not
just to help the client achieve what she wants, but to work with the client
to help her figure out what she wants.77 The client's ambivalence is not a
moment to be confronted and worked through, but an important and
continuing aspect of a case. The process of deciding what she wants may
even be bound up for the client with the process of attempting to bring
about an articulated goal. When concrete actions are taken to move towards
a goal, a client may see that the goal is not what she understood it to be
abstractly, or that the goal has consequences she did not foresee. As the
client shifts in what she wants, the lawyer can come to understand the
multiple meanings that each step within the legal system has for a woman
who is abused within an intimate relationship.7"
ability to adapt to the changing stories of the client in order to assist the client in coming to
her own decisions with the lawyer about the legal story she wants to tell).
75. Espinoza, supm note 14, at 908, 912-14, 926; Meier, supra note 14, at 1364-66;
Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1229.
76. Descriptions of client-centered lawyering rhetorically affirm the importance of
client-centered decision-making and create models for taking great time and care with the
process of developing, examining and arriving at decisions. See BASTRESS & HARBAUGH,
supra note 57, at 235-36, 256, 264-65, 267-68; BINDER ET AL., supra note 57, at 1272-80;
Dinerstein, supra note 57, at 502-1I. Nonetheless, even client-centered lawyering can have
a strongly instrumental feel to it. Once the client's goals are articulated, the lawyer goes
about furthering them. Even if that process of implementing the client's goals is a
collaborative one within which the client actively participates, see, e.g., Mills, Silence, supra
note 14, at 1229-31, 1257, the unstable character of the client's goal(s) has not received
significant attention within the literature about client-centeredness.
77. See Shalleck, supra note 57, at 156-57, 168 (stressing the importance of
exploring, at multiple levels and in multiple ways, what story a client wants to tell, how a
client wants to be portrayed, and what a client wants in the process of constructing a case
theory).
78. See id., at 164-65, 166-67 (discussing the importance of evaluating the results of
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C. Working Collaboratively with Clients
The lawyer and client operate collaboratively within these models of
lawyering.79 This collaboration is grounded in two principles. First, this
model rejects the pre-eminence of legal solutions for women who are abused
in their intimate relationships."0 Not only are legal remedies limited in their
effectiveness in stopping or reducing violence, but they can interfere with
a woman's ability to develop for herself both an understanding of the
violence in her intimate relationships and responses that enable her to alter
the situation in ways that meet her changing needs. At their worst, legal
actions can further harm women.8 If the lawyer treats legal understanding
of violence and legal remedies as no better than any other possible under-
standing or response, and if the lawyer views a woman's decision to pursue
a legal remedy as constantly fluid, then the lawyer has no special claim to
expertise. 2 Within this framework, a client must be treated as an equal
participant in shaping both the understanding of what type of action should
be taken and how it should be pursued.
Second, the lawyer's ability to act effectively for his or her client is
dependent upon a relationship within which lawyer and client recognize each
other as jointly involved in a common enterprise.8 3 For some of the
theorists of this model of lawyering, the lawyer not only takes on a client's
goal, but participates with the client in achieving a goal that has significance
legal action from the perspective of the client and in terms of the client's life).
79. Bryant & Arias, supra note 16, at 216; Mills, Silence, supra note 16, at 1228-30,
1244, 1246, 1258, 1260; O'Leary, supra note 14, at 215, 218, 224; Shalleck, supra note 51,
at 168. See also David F. Chavkin, Matchmaker, Matchmaker- Student Collaboration in
Clinical Programs, I CLINICAL L. REV. 199 (1994) (analyzing the teaching of collaboration
in lawyering).
80. Finn, supra note 5, at 44-46, 51-53 (offering nonlegal options for women who are
abused); Mills, Silence, supra note 16, at 1233-38, 1256, 1261-62; Shalleck, supra note 57,
at 150, 157, 166, 168 (describing the importance of lawyers not translating client stories into
legal theories or client goals into legal solutions without the active participation of the client).
81. Bryant & Arias, supra note 14, at 219; Mills, Intuition, supra note 14, at 188-89;
Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1227, 1233-38; see also supra notes 35 and 44.
82. The importance of both legal and non-legal client concerns, as well as legal and
non-legal solutions to client problems are powerful themes in standard clinical literature.
See, e.g., BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 57, at 256; BINDER ET AL., supra note 57, at
5, 8-10, 13-14, 201-03, 295. Elsewhere, I have critiqued the demarcation of the legal from
the non-legal. Shalleck, supra note 64, at 1749-50; see also Cahn, supra note 20, at 2502-03,
2507-08 (discussing a more equal attorney-client relationship).
83. Although the lawyer's approval of a client's effort is not the same as entering into
a collaborative relationship with the client, approval may often be a significant part of the
lawyer's attitude toward the client in approaching representation collaboratively. See
Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, supra note 57, at 994-1005 (discussing the functions of
approval in the lawyer-client relationship).
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for both of them. 4 For some advocates of this model of lawyering, this
collaboration entails at least some form of self-disclosure by the lawyer."5
Advocates of this approach stress the importance of the respect and shared
commitment that come from mutual self-disclosure that is part of a
collaborative effort despite the dangers of manipulation, imposition of the
lawyer's understandings and responses on a client, and the inequality that
may be a part of the lawyer's having and exercising discretion about how
and when to disclose aspects of his or her life to the client.86
D. Developing Responses that Enable Clients to Take Steps that A re
Viable Within Their Particular Situations
This model of lawyering is particularly attentive to the limitations of
remedies available through the legal system to women who have been in
abusive relationships. Even the legal system's more innovative efforts of
the last few years fail to respond to the needs of most women who are
attempting to figure out ways to deal with the violence in their intimate
relationships. 7 Because of the legal system's emphasis upon eradicating
violence rather than understanding it or helping women find ways to address
the intimate violence in their own lives, as well as the system's emphasis
upon the termination of a woman's relationship with the person who has
abused her, the remedies available through the legal system often do not
provide women an opportunity to make the changes in their lives that they
need. When the inadequacies of these remedies are combined with the need
to conform to the stereotypical image of a "battered woman" that the legal
system reinforces, many women seek to escape from the system once they
enter it or are deterred from even approaching it at all.88
84. See Goldfarb, supra note 15, at 1670; Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1229,
1231, 1255, 1258; see also Gerald Lopez, Training Future Lawyers to Work with the
Politically and Socially Subordinated: A nti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305,
356-57 (1988-1989) (advocating collaboration as an important skill for lawyers working with
clients who are subordinated).
85. Margulies, supra note 39, at 504; Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1258-60; see
also O' Leary, supra note 14, at 215-17; cf Kathleen A. Sullivan, Self-Disclosure, Separation,
and Students: Intimacy in the Clinical Relationship, 27 IND. L. REv. 115 (1993) (discussing
self-disclosure within the clinical teacher-student relationship).
86. For a discussion of the dangers of lawyer self-disclosure, see Ellmann, Ethic of
Care, supra note 57, at 2696-97; O'Leary, supra note 14, at 217-18.
87. Becker, supra note 35, at 16-17; Espinoza, supra note 14, at 906-09, 911-12;
Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1231-38.
88. See Bryant & Arias, supra note 14, at 216, 219-20; Cahn, supra note 20, at 2486-
87; Cahn & Meier, supra note 15, at 344-45; Espinoza, supra note 14, at 927; Margulies,
supra note 37, at 185; Margulies, supra note 39, at 504, 507; Meier, supra note 14, at 1343-
46; Miccio, supra note 32, at 1097-98 (exploring "battered women's" reluctance in using the
legal system); Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1239, 1242, 1249-52.
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Within this legal context, lawyers for women who have been abused
face several challenging tasks in their relationship with a client. The lawyer
needs to work with the client to develop a variety of actions that both fit
with the client's sense of her own capacity for acting and respond to the
shifting and conflicting needs that the client feels.89 Also, the lawyer needs
to explore with the client how each of those responses might work if
implemented." Each response might or might not have a legal component
to it.9 ' The lawyer needs to respect the client's judgments about the dangers
that any action might pose, as well as the disruption of the client's life that
each action could entail. In identifying and explaining various legal actions
that could be a part of a client's plan, the lawyer needs to be particularly
careful not to favor legal action over other kinds of actions, either implicitly
or explicitly.92 Furthermore, in describing the nature of the legal actions, as
well as the multiple consequences that might flow from them, the lawyer
needs to draw upon his or her understanding of the client in anticipating the
meaning that those consequences could have for the client in her own
struggle to deal with the violence in her relationship.93
E. Making Time
Often, for lawyers, time assumes the quality of a commodity. While it
feels like the most precious thing we have, it also feels like the one over
which we have the least control. Lawyers can feel that they are constantly
in a responsive mode, answering to multiple demands, each of which makes
a claim upon their time, often unpredictably and insistently. Against this
backdrop, lawyering in this model requires that lawyers recognize the
centrality of time in the process of representing women who have been in
89. Meier, supra note 14, at 1334-37; Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1227, 1260.
90. Meier, supra note 14, at 1334-37; Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1227, 1260.
91. Robert Dinerstein provides an insightful critique of lawyer-centered development
of alternatives in the work of DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING
AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977), as well as an interesting example
of how a lawyer can work with a client to develop options in terms of the client's
understanding of what choices mean in the client's life, rather than in terms of legal
categories. Dinerstein, supra note 57, at 509-603. Clinical literature has addressed in detail
the process of working with clients to identify possible actions and to evaluate those
possibilities in terms of a broad definition of a client's needs. See, e.g., BASTRESS &
HARBAUGH, supra note 57, at 255-82; BINDER ET AL., supra note 57, at 272-361 (addressing
the role of a lawyer in a client's decision-making process).
92. Bryant & Arias, supra note 14, at 218; Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1233-38,
1241, 1256, 1261-62; Shalleck, supra note 57, at 150, 157, 166, 168.
93. See BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 57, at 258-65 (discussing what they refer
to as "advanced empathy," which is a process that involves anticipating thoughts and feelings
that the lawyer thinks are implicit in a client's account of her or his situation).
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abusive relationships.94 Each of the elements of lawyering identified above
demands significant and often unpredictable allocations of time. In order to
be self-reflective in a serious and meaningful way, the lawyer must set aside
time to explore his or her own feelings and experiences.95 Developing
empathic understanding of the relationships surrounding the violence in
someone's life involves becoming familiar with the details and texture of her
experiences and thoughts. Accepting the constant changes in a client's
desires regarding her situation requires patience and attention to the reasons
for the shifts in understanding and decisions. The mutual recognition of
shared understanding and shared projects that characterizes a collaborative
relationship comes only after multiple interactions and much exploration in
the search for common ground. Developing with a client creative and
specifically tailored responses to her situation is a process that results only
after lawyer and client have imagined and explored multiple possibilities.
Identifying some elements of a model of representation for women who
have been abused is an important step in developing ways to make the law
and the legal system genuinely valuable tools for women seeking to deal
with violence in their lives. Lawyers have the potential to be both important
resources for these women as they confront the legal system, as well as
theorists with a critical perspective on the law that is firmly rooted in
concrete experiences with many different women who are seeking to bring
about some change in their lives. Defining the characteristics of an
aspirational model of lawyering is, however, only one step in this process.
It is necessary to examine, from the perspective of practice, the assumptions
contained within the models and the meaning that the characteristics of the
model have when implemented through the actual work of lawyering and
teaching people to be lawyers. From our actual practices, we can see not
only our articulated goals, but also the assumptions implicit in our practices,
as well as the meaning that these characteristics of the model have when
implemented through the actual work of lawyering.
III. THEORY AND EXPERIENCE
The feminist critique of the dominant legal frameworks for addressing
domestic violence, as well as the efforts of a group of theorists of practice
to formulate a model for representation of women who have been abused
provide a basis for a dialogue about the roles of theory and experience in
shaping our understanding of the law affecting women who have been
abused and lawyers' representation of these women. Feminist theorists have
94. Bryant & Arias, supra note 14, at 222; Espinoza, supra note 14, at 908, 923-24;
Margulies, supra note 14, at 1073, 1088; Mills, Intuition, supra note 14, at 192; Mills,
Silence, supra note 14, at 1229-30.




become increasingly concerned that legal developments affecting women
who have been abused are failing in significant ways to meet the needs of
women who confront violence in their intimate relationships. These insights
have emerged largely from an examination of the relationship between
theoretical understandings of domestic violence and the actual contexts
within which theories about abuse have been given meaning.' Theorists of
practice have been working for nearly a decade to develop a contextualized
understanding of law and legal practice.97 Examining the representation of
women who have been abused provides an opportunity to see how
theoretical understandings of intimate abuse and women's experiences of
abuse matter to our understanding of law and lawyering in a particular
context, and how our experiences of representing women who have been
abused can provide critical insights about the legal frameworks for
addressing intimate abuse.
My approach to this inquiry about theory and experience comes from
my work in a clinical program in which students provide representation to
women in a wide variety of contexts, including the context of abuse by an
intimate partner.98 Although the clinic is not focused solely on domestic
violence, the students in the clinic provide representation in many different
legal actions to women who have been abused. For example, they represent
women who have been abused in actions to obtain and enforce civil
protection orders," custody and support actions, divorce, and child neglect
cases in which domestic violence may or may not be a part of the claim that
a child has been neglected,"° as well as a wide variety of legal matters, such
96. Elizabeth Schneider has played a particularly important role in fostering an
understanding, rooted both in theory and in practice, of abused women. See, e.g., Schneider,
supra note 1; Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectivesfmm
the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986).
97. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, The Politics of Clinical Knowledge, 35 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 7, 9 (1990); Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L. REV.
697, 719-28 (1992); Espinoza, supra note 14, at 925, 927; Goldfarb, supra note 57, at 1601;
Lopez, supra note 84, at 323-25. In part, this move to greater context has been in reaction
to the highly abstract model of the lawyer-client relationship articulated by David A. Binder
and Susan C. Price in 1977, BINDER & PRICE, supra note 91, with revisions that included
Paul Bergman in 1991. See BNDER ET AL., supra note 57, at 272-361. In addition, the
attention to context in the lawyer-client relationship is part of a broader move toward a
contextualized understanding of the law. See, e.g., Katherine Bartlett, Feminist Legal
Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990); Martha Minow & Elizabeth Spelman, In Context,
63 CAL. L. REV. 1597 (1990).
98. See Mithra Merryman, A Survey of Domestic Violence Pogramns in Legal
Education, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 383, 428 (1993) (providing a description of the Women
and the Law Clinic).
99. In the District of Columbia, where my students practice, these actions are known
as "Intrafamily Offense" actions. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1006 (1997).
100. See Ann Shalleck, Child Custody and Child Neglect: Parenthood in Legal Practice
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as housing or public benefits cases, where legal action can assist a woman
in dealing with the issues that abuse has created or contributed to in her life.
In addition, although the students in the clinic are not the prosecutors
handling the cases, they frequently provide representation to women who
have decided to pursue criminal remedies as they go through the various
steps of the criminal process.
In the process of teaching students to provide representation to these
women, I am constantly confronting the roles of theory and experience in
shaping the students' and my own understanding of women who have been
abused, and of the relationship between lawyer and client in a situation in
which a woman has been abused. In addition, the work of representing
women who have been abused can create a critical vantage point from
which to evaluate and challenge the theories about women who have been
abused that dominate the legal world. The work described above of the
feminist theorists who have challenged the underlying visions of the
"battered woman" and of "battering" that are currently ascendant in legal
thought and action, as well as the work of the theorists of practice who have
attempted to define a model of lawyering for women who have been abused,
have both contributed significantly to my understanding of what and how
we should teach students about being lawyers for these women, and how our
teaching can challenge dominant visions of women who have been abused.
In examining the activity of teaching students in a clinical program, we
need to address not only our intentions, but also the assumptions that we
find embedded within our pedagogical work. Within the choices that we
make in organizing and carrying out our educational project, we can find the
visions that are implicit in the particular actions that we take. 10 When we
identify the assumptions underlying the contradictions and complexities of
the difficult choices clinical teachers make daily about teaching their
students to represent women who have been abused, we create an opportuni-
ty for critical reflection about the vision of the lawyer-client relationship that
animates our choices, the understanding of women who have been abused
that we find in ourselves, in our students and in the legal system, and a
method of contributing to the development of theory about domestic
violence and the law.
As we teach students about the process of representing women who have
been abused, how do we make theory, in particular theories about these
women who are or will be their clients, a fundamental part of teaching them
and Culture, in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF
MOTHERHOOD 308 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995) (discussing a
child neglect and custody case handled in the clinic in which the client's experience with
abuse became apparent only at the point that she sought to transfer custody of her children
to her mother).
101. See Shalleck, supra note 57, at 109 (using the choices made in clinical
supervision to identify and examine the assumptions underlying the process of supervision).
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to be lawyers for these women? This question is important for at least three
reasons. First, if one thinks that a theoretical understanding affects the
representation that people provide, then, as an instrumental matter, it is
important to explore how that theoretical understanding operates in shaping
students' representation of women who have been abused. Second, clinical
programs provide a useful position from which to engage in the develop-
ment and the critique of theory. Situated in law schools, yet engaged in the
day-to-day practice of law, clinical programs have the time, the resources,
the knowledge that comes from actual practice, and an environment to
support theoretical exploration. Third, if we are to take seriously the
multiple calls for a contextualized understanding of legal practice,0 2 we
need to develop ways to teach a type of practice that is attentive to the
context created by the clients' lives, the institutional structures affecting their
lives, and the legal frameworks and legal cultures that operate in shaping a
client's experience of the legal system." 3 In short, teaching theory is
important in developing lawyers and developing theory.
The question of how teaching theories about domestic violence may
affect the attitudes and behavior of the students providing representation to
women who have been abused raises at least three problematic issues. The
first relates to the contested nature of domestic violence theory. If teaching
theory includes presenting students with the dominant frameworks concern-
ing "battering" and "battered women," the work of feminist theorists
challenging these dominant paradigms alerts us to the dangers that the
dominant paradigms present in the operation of the legal system. These
dominant theoretical frameworks for understanding domestic violence both
reflect assumptions about domestic violence that are implicit in the practices
of the actors within the legal system and, at the same time, powerfully shape
those practices. These dominant frameworks for understanding women who
have been abused might shape the students' understanding of their clients
in a similar way and, therefore, affect how the students interpret and respond
to their clients. °4
The various theories that portray women primarily as victims often
contain within them an implicit vision of the woman as having an incorrect
or false understanding of her situation.'0 5 Because these theories can
102. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
103. See Shalleck, supra note 57, at 169,172.
104. One of the primary assumptions of clinical theory, in its many forms, has been
that conceptual understanding and experience interact to create knowledge about lawyering.
See, e.g., Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical
Education as Methodology, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 374 (1973);
Goldfarb, supra note 58, at 1647-48, 1650-54; Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal
Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. REv. 577 (1987).
105. This supposedly flawed consciousness of their choices explains, at least in part,
why women stay in relationships involving violence.
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encourage students to distrust clients' own accounts of their experiences and
interpret their clients' understandings of their experiences through the filter
of the dominant stereotypes, these theories may very well impede students
in listening to and hearing, let alone respecting, women's own interpretations
of their experiences of intimate violence. In addition, these dominant
frameworks support interventions intended to promote the safety of the
woman through separation from the person who is abusing her. They may,
therefore, encourage students to impose on a client subtly or unconsciously,
or even directly and consciously, their own judgments about the actions she
should take. If these theories of domestic violence promote these effects,
then teaching them is not likely to contribute to the development of a type
of representation that accords with the aims of either the feminist critics of
the dominant theories of domestic violence or the theorists of practice.
These theories of "battering" and "battered women" may possibly validate
the assumptions implicit in the legal frameworks that the students confront
and the assumptions the students themselves bring to the experience.
But what if the work of the feminist theorists challenging the dominant
frameworks is included in the presentation of theory, as it certainly should
be? This solution, although it fits easily with common forms of academic
discourse in which multiple, competing theories are presented and debated,
is not without its problems within the context of actual clients and actual
cases. The significant divisions within current feminist thought concerning
the proper legal frameworks for addressing women's experiences of abuse,
disputes that reveal differing visions of women and of the role of the law,
are not simply the disputes of the classroom."° These different visions,
when realized in the actions of lawyers, can create different attitudes and
behaviors in the lawyer. How do we, as teachers, help the students not only
to think through and evaluate the competing theories, but also to figure out
how to act with their clients in light of their developing understanding of the
theoretical debates? When we as teachers of domestic violence theory have
our own views about the theoretical debates and about the relationship of
those debates to legal representation, how do we supervise students in their
106. Hanna, supra note 46, at 1850. For example, some believe the law should be an
instrument for eradicating or decreasing violence against women, for punishing violent
behavior, or for strengthening societal norms stigmatizing abuse. Others believe the law
should further women's own efforts to find safety, to deal with the violence in their own
lives, and to devise remedies that work in their own particular situations. Two areas that
demonstrate these divisions are mandatory arrest and mandatory prosecution. Both have
generated intense disagreements among feminists concerning the proper role for the law in
the area of domestic violence. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 47, at 201; Hanna, supra note
46, at 1850; Sheila J. Kuehl, Introduction to Forum: Mandatory Prosecution in Domestic
Violence Cases, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 169 (1997); Mills, Intuition, supra note 14, at 183;




client representation when they take actions that accord with frameworks
with which we disagree? °7
Domestic violence theory is not only contested, but also constantly
changing and developing. Feminist criticism of the dominant frameworks
for understanding domestic violence is part of a process of change and
discovery.' 8 As theorists and activists create both new concepts for
understanding women's experience of violence in intimate relationships and
different legal frameworks for addressing those experiences, and as they
work within the actual conditions of the world to shape the law and legal
institutions in light of their evolving understanding, their theory changes as
they confront in practice the realization of their theoretical insights in the
legal and social world. Some of the elements of current feminist critique of
the dominant frameworks concerning domestic violence may turn out, when
realized in practice, to be problematic in their own right. For example,
some of the feminist critics, in an attempt to emphasize the agency of
women who have been abused and to validate the perspectives of the
women themselves, may romanticize the actions and perspectives of the
women. The elements of resistance, intentionality, and strategic wisdom
ascribed by feminist critics to women who have been abused' 9 may serve
to further respect for them individually and for their understandings of the
meaning of their experiences. When realized in practice, however, these
elements could give rise to an alternative stereotype that may, in its own
ways, prove harmful to women. Women who are abused may go from
being stereotypical victims to stereotypical heroes. When we give students
even the best critical perspectives that we have available, what do we want
them to do with shifting, unstable, partial theoretical understandings as they
meet and work with their clients?
Third, in order to educate lawyers who can provide meaningful
representation to women who have been abused, we need to integrate the
teaching of domestic violence theory with the teaching of both the theory
and practice of client representation. Theoretical sophistication and insight
does not necessarily translate into representation that is helpful to a woman
who has been abused. " 0 Developing contextualized understandings of legal
107. See Espinoza, supra note 14, at 919-22 (critiquing her supervision of a student's
approach to a domestic violence case); Shalleck, supra note 57, at 177-78 (discussing the
conflicts a clinical teacher faces and the need for reflectiveness in evaluating supervisory
decisions).
108. Elizabeth Schneider has stressed the importance of understanding the process by
which feminists develop knowledge about domestic violence, a process she identifies as
"dialectical." Schneider, supra note 1, at 520-26; see also Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert
Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 195 (1986); Schneider, supra note 96, at
598-601.
109. See, e.g., Littleton, supra note 15, at 30, 41-42.
110. Even having clarity about what is "helpful" is problematic. See Cahn, supra note
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practice involves a rethinking of the content of our clinical courses. Over
the last twenty-five years, clinicians have developed multiple conceptions of
the issues that are fundamental to being a lawyer. They have also written
textbooks reflecting these conceptions of the subject matter of clinical
education."' A rich and varied literature expanding, modifying and
challenging these models has emerged."2 Several of these commentators
have stressed the need for an increased awareness of the impact of context
on our understanding of lawyering." 3  How then do we integrate the
teaching of lawyering theory with theories applicable to the context of the
cases or clients whom our students are representing? Do we maintain the
fundamental structures of our thinking about lawyering, while making them
more context specific?" 4 Do we develop alternative approaches to the
project of teaching students to be lawyers that are structured around the
specific context of the representation?'
To begin to work through these three problematic aspects of teaching
domestic violence theory, we can use several aspects of the educational
experience of a clinic to help frame the choices teachers have in deciding
whether and how to present theories about women who have been abused:
timing, structure, and the relationship of responsibility, reflection and
learning.
A. Timing
Deciding when to address theories about domestic violence depends
largely upon one's view of the relationship between theory and experience
in assisting students in figuring out how to work with their clients. If
students have the theories early in their clinical experience, 6 that theoretical
understanding may help them in identifying, at least cognitively, from the
very beginning of their representation of clients the multiple, detailed,
70, at 1420-24, 1427-29.
111. See, e.g., BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 57; GARY BELLOW & BEA
MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS (1978); BINDER & PRICE, supra note 91; BINDER ET
AL., supra note 57.
112. See supra note 64 for examples of work challenging the dominant models of
clinical theory.
113. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
114. Susan Bryant and Maria Arias, in their description of their Battered Women's
Rights Clinic, take this approach. Bryant & Arias, supra note 14, at 209-10.
115. Joan Meier, in her description of the Domestic Violence Advocacy Project,
partially restructures her course around the psychological dynamics of domestic violence,
while maintaining, in other parts of her clinic, the examination of the standard categories of
lawyering. Meier, supra note 14, at 1325-56.
116. A teacher may even choose to delay the beginning of client representation until
after an initial period of theoretical study in order to stress the importance of theoretical
questions about the nature of domestic violence.
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intricate ways in which their representation is related to the frameworks for
addressing domestic violence that dominate the legal system and affected by
their own underlying assumptions about women who have been abused.
When they begin actual representation, they may be able to identify more
readily how the frameworks within which domestic violence is handled by
the legal system contain assumptions that need not be taken as givens.. In
addition, the process of confronting theoretical debates explicitly, when
approached with techniques that encourage reflection and not just analytic
mastery, '7 has the potential to increase students' awareness of their own
attitudes about and experiences with violence. In addition, when the
students begin to have interactions with their clients, they may be able to
test out and evaluate, in light of this experience, the theories they have
studied. Their knowledge may become rooted, not just in the analytic
component of the theoretical debates, but also in the multiple aspects of
their feelings and their experiences." 8
Alternatively, examination of domestic violence theories can be delayed
until after students have had some experience in representing women who
have been abused. If students are presented with multiple, competing
theories about domestic violence prior to their contact with their clients,
when they begin that representation they may be overwhelmed by their
awareness of the conflicting consequences for representation entailed by the
different theories. At the same time that they are trying to make sense of
the fundamentals of the most basic activities of representing someone," 9
they are also confronting the challenge of understanding theoretical
questions about the nature of "battering" and the meaning of the construct
of the "battered woman" in terms of concrete choices about how to act with
their clients. 2 '
In addition, where examination of domestic violence theory has initiated
the students into their clinical experience, they may be so focused upon the
meaning of particular choices they make with their clients in terms of
competing domestic violence theories that they may miss the particularity
and individuality of each client.' 2' Also, by beginning with theory, we may
communicate implicitly that experience is primarily a way of testing theory,
rather than the basis for the development of theory. If, however, we explore
117. See BELLOW, supra note 104, at 388-89 (discussing different pedagogical
techniques for capturing multiple aspects of understanding a subject).
118. Id. at 382, 387-88; Bryant & Arias, supra note 14, at 219-22; Goldfarb, supra note
58, at 1647-54.
119. A process that is enormously complex in its own rights. See Bellow, supra note
104, at 391.
120. See Meier, supra note 14, at 1329-30 (discussing difficulties students have in
applying theory to case representation).
121. They may also, as Joan Meier describes, compartmentalize their knowledge about
domestic violence from their work as lawyers. Id.
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theories of domestic violence primarily after students have had some
experiences representing women who have been abused, we have the
potential to validate the students' own experiences of listening to and
working with women as a source for critiquing, modifying, and creating
theory. 22
We can time the presentation and analysis of domestic violence theory
in many ways over the duration of a clinic so as to intersect and interact
with the experiences of the students in providing representation to their
clients. We can also use different techniques for addressing theory that are
designed with the timing of each presentation of theory in mind. For
example, within the different components of a clinic, the teacher may
identify themes, such as agency and victimization, early in the course, which
can be developed and explored as the students have increasing experience
representing women who have been abused. Also, tasks that call upon
students to theorize based on their experiences can be intermixed with
opportunities to evaluate the theories of others based on what has happened
in the students' own work.
Additionally, by breaking down the barriers between what has been
conceived of as the teaching of lawyering and the teaching of theory
regarding the context of people's lives, we can make theory an integrated
part of the subject matter of a clinical course from the beginning, rather than
an activity separate from the process of representation.'23 The teacher can
identify what clinical teachers have understood primarily as lawyering
activities needed to begin the process of representation, such as listening,
and reconceptualize them as activities fundamental to the understanding of
women who have been abused.24 The integrated teaching of these activities
from the beginning of a clinical course, as part of both basic lawyering and
a basic understanding of women who have been abused, can implicitly
transmit important messages about domestic violence and about lawyering.
Skills and substance are not two separate spheres. Listening is not an
abstract skill that lawyers must have, but an activity that matters profoundly
in shaping the lawyer-client relationship with a woman who has been
abused. Also, domestic violence cannot be understood unless advocates
learn to listen to women who have been abused.
The complicated skill of listening carefully not just to the details of a
woman's experience, but also to her understanding of that experience, to the
ambiguities and conflicts in her accounts of events, and to her formulations
of desired results is one essential component of recognizing the particularity
122. See Goldfarb, supra note 58, at 1652; White, Paradox, supra note 64, at 859.
123. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Stances, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1233 (1992)
(discussing different visions of the practices of lawyering).
124. See Bryant & Arias, supra note 14, at 216-19 (providing an example of a seminar




of each woman's experience. For the feminist critics of domestic violence
theory, this aspect of representation is a necessary starting point for
challenging the essentializing of "battered women" and "battering."
Through this reconceptualization of fundamental lawyering activities, the
student, while learning lawyering, is also exploring through action the
theories of domestic violence. Because listening as a part of lawyering and
listening as a part of understanding domestic violence are intertwined, the
teacher can teach both throughout the development of the course. As the
student learns about the difficulties and uncertainties of what it means to
listen to what is said and not said, and discovers how to listen to both the
words and the silences, the student can begin to see the complexities and
uncertainties of understanding each particular client's experience of abuse. 5
In addition, in learning about listening to women who are abused, students
can also start to see the different meanings that listening can have within
different contexts. The activity of listening to a client may be a part of all
lawyering, but it may take different forms and have different significance for
representation when carried out in different contexts.'26
Also, teaching from the first moments of a course the theory of domestic
violence as part of the practice of representing women who have been
abused, we transmit certain assumptions about theory, both the theory of
domestic violence and the theory of lawyering. We teach students that
theory must be grounded in our ongoing attempts to listen to and understand
the experiences of women who have been abused.127 We convey that our
understanding is partial, shifting, and tentative. Finally, we communicate
that our actions as lawyers do not just reflect prevailing frameworks of
domestic violence, but have the potential to shape those frameworks. The
interaction between lawyer and client is a part of constructing what it means
for a woman who has been abused to deal with the legal system. We teach
our students that the actions of a lawyer need not replicate existing
frameworks for understanding domestic violence, but can contribute to new
understandings of domestic violence by creating space for the experiences
of the client to be heard, even if that space is just the lawyer's office and
the understanding is partial and unstable.
12
1
125. See id. at 219; Espinoza, supra note 14, at 922-23 (discussing particular client
experiences of abuse).
126. Espinoza, supra note 14, at 927.
127. Espinoza, supra note 14, at 908, 911-13; Shalleck, supra note 64, at 1749, 1751;
Ann Shalleck, The Feminist Tramsfonnation of Lawyefing: A Response to Naomi Cahn, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1078-79 (1992); White, Paradox, supra note 64, at 854-55.
128. See Alfieri, supra note 123, at 1234; Espinoza, supra note 14, at 916-17; Miller,
supra note 64, at 488; Shalleck, supra note 64, at 1751.
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B. Structure
The structures for learning that we have in our clinics provide us with
many different types of opportunities for making theory a part of our
educational project. Clinical teachers have developed several interrelated
components to their clinical courses, all of which offer distinctive ways to
make the teaching of theories of domestic violence a part of clinical
teaching. The fundamental assumption underlying all of these structures is
that the interaction between the experience of being a lawyer, reflection
upon that experience, and intellectual inquiry related to that experience
creates knowledge about lawyering. 29 The three most common components
of clinical courses are the classroom,"30 case rounds, and supervision of
student representation.'3 ' In each of these, we can make the theory of
domestic violence a part of the material of the course. The choices we
make about how to address the theory within these different components
reflect our understanding about what theory is and how theory and experi-
ence interact to enable students to represent better women who have been
abused.
Domestic violence theory can be addressed in the classroom in multiple
ways. Although assigning sets of readings and devoting particular classes
to aspects of domestic violence theory is the most common form for
addressing theoretical questions and debates,'32 we have other pedagogical
techniques that can be used as part of the classroom component of a clinic
to teach theory. 133 For example, simulations, which are frequently used to
129. See, e.g., Bellow, supra note 104, at 386-88; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical
Legal Education-A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612, 616-17 (1984); Frank
S. Bloch, The A ndrological Basis of Clinical Legal Education, 35 VAND. L. REV. 321 (1982);
Kenneth R. Kreiling, Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learning
to Learnfrom Experience Through Propery Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV.
284, 288 (1981).
130. I include in the classroom component the use of simulation as a teaching
technique since the classroom components of many clinical programs use simulations as one
of the primary means for teaching students the basic concepts of the course. See Shalleck,
supra note 57, at 142 n.32; Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Lawyering Revolution and Legal
Education 17-19 (July 15, 1985) (unpublished paper presented at the Cambridge Lectures,
on file with author).
13 1. For a discussion of the components of clinical courses, see Shalleck, supra note
57, at 141-49. 1 am not including in this discussion the use of community service, law
reform or impact advocacy projects not undertaken for a client or client group because I am
focusing in this article on teaching about the lawyer-client relationship. A number of clinics
include these projects as components of their courses. See, e.g., Bryant & Arias, supra note
14, at 210, 212; Meier, supra note 14, at 1325.
132. For an example of the use of readings and classroom discussion, see Bryant &
Arias, supra note 14, at 217; Meier, supra note 14, at 1326-27.
133. See Bellow, supra note 104, at 388-89 (identifying pedagogical techniques for
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teach lawyering activities such as interviewing, counseling or negotiation,
may present situations involving domestic violence, which can raise
fundamental questions about how domestic violence is conceptualized.'34
Although often used as a technique for teaching lawyering skills,
simulations can be effective in presenting theoretical material. In individual
critiques of the students' behavior in the simulations, in small group
discussion of experiences in the simulation or in classroom discussion of
issues raised in the simulation, the choices made by the students while in
role in the simulation can illustrate how particular behaviors in the lawyer-
client relationship reflect underlying theoretical assumptions about domestic
violence.'35 Using videotape, the teacher can present and compare a variety
of student behaviors reflecting differing assumptions about domestic
violence. The teacher can also ask the students to think about and try
alternative ways of acting in the simulation that reflect different underlying
Visions of who "battered women" are. The experience in the simulation
coupled with the analysis of the meaning contained within different ways of
acting can serve as an entry point into theoretical debates about domestic
violence.
In addition, teachers can use the simulation as a stimulus for reflection
upon the students' own experiences of violence or powerlessness. Student
journals or reflection pieces about what happened in the simulation, what
thoughts and feelings the events evoked, and how those role experiences
relate to the students' own experiences in their lives when not in a role in
the simulation can be valuable in getting students to connect a theoretical
understanding of domestic violence with their experiences when out of
role.'36 We can use various techniques to make parts of the journal entries
an element of the material of the classroom.'37 Making students' reflections
understanding the material of the course).
134. See Bryant & Arias, supra note 14, at 216.
135. See Meier, supra note 14, at 1335-36 (describing simulation critiques focused on
"meta-messages" conveyed by the asking of certain questions or the responses to client
statements or questions).
136. See Charles R. Lawrence, II, The Word and the River Pedagogy as Scholarship
as Strggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231 (1992) (stressing the importance of journals in
revealing the diversity of student experiences and giving voice to those least likely to feel
that they can speak with authority); J. P. Ogilvy, The Use of Journals in Legal Education:
A Tool for Reflection, 3 CLINICAL L. REV. 55 (1996) (discussing the process and role of
journal writing in different types of law courses).
137. Care needs to be taken in using journal entries. Ogilvy, supra note 136, at 92-96
(addressing ways to preserve student privacy and confidentiality). When writing in their
journals, students need to know under what conditions their entries are to be made accessible
to the whole class, either in identifying or non-identifying form. Teachers may get students'
consent to distribution of an entry to the entire class. There are also techniques for using
parts of journal entries from many students which do not identify particular, students. For
example, if the entire entries are not distributed to the class, the teacher could extract
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upon their own experiences a part of the analysis of theories of domestic
violence is particularly important to the attempts of theorists of practice to
create a model of representation of women who have been abused.
Awareness of how one's own ideas, feelings and experiences affect one's
reactions to a woman who has been abused is critical to an understanding
not just of the client, but also of the nature of abusive relationships.1
38
Therefore, by encouraging reflection upon the students' own experiences,
journals can help to make those experiences an explicit part of understand-
ing theories of domestic violence.
Simulations are also a way to expand the students' understanding of
what being a lawyer for a woman who has been abused means. Simulation
conducted as part of a classroom course can begin to break down amazingly
resistant student constructs about what it is to be a lawyer. Students often
arrive at clinics believing that "doing law" is learning substantive rules of
law, reading and analyzing cases and statutes, identifying doctrinal issues,
finding policy arguments, and constructing a legal argument out of legal
materials. 39 One of the major contributions of clinical work has been the
articulation and conceptualization of a variety of other activities that go into
the work of a lawyer."4 One trend within clinical scholarship has been the
presentation of these activities as neutral skills whose components can be
neatly identified and categorized. 4' Another trend has been the develop-
ment of a variety of critical perspectives on lawyering, often referred to as
the theoretics of practice,'42 which, while including differing approaches to
lawyering, all share profound skepticism about the project of identifying a
neutral, universally applicable model of lawyering. In a simulation
involving representation of a woman who has been abused, students can feel
and analyze how being an effective lawyer for that woman involves not only
mastering the wide range of activities that clinical scholars have identified
as part of lawyering, but also developing a critical understanding of what
segments from a variety of journals to illustrate different experiences with and reactions to
violence and powerlessness.
138. See supra Part ll.A (concerning the importance of reflection for empathic
understanding of the client's situation, a nuanced view of the nature and dynamics of
domestic violence, and respect for a client's understanding of and judgment about her life).
139. For a very insightful critique of the traditional educational project of most law
schools, see Amsterdam, supra note 130, at 2-7, 9-12.
140. See, e.g., BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 57; BELLOW & MOULTON, supra
note I ll; BINDER ET AL., supra note 57.
141. See Shalleck, supra note 64, at 1743-48 (critiquing the neutral conception of
lawyering presented in the work of BINDER ET AL.).
142. See, e.g., Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty, supra note 64; Goldfarb, supra note 58;
Lopez, supra note 43; Symposium, The Emperor's Old Prose: Reexamining the Language of
Law, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1233 (1992); Symposium, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration
of Progressive Thought and Action, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992).
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each of those activities means in the course of acting as a lawyer for that
woman.
Case rounds are also an important setting for the development of an
understanding of theories of domestic violence.'43 By bringing together for
shared analysis the students' experiences in their cases, case rounds permit
students to see a variety of ways to handle situations involving violence in
intimate relationships, to challenge one another in their approaches to the
clients and the cases, to expand each others' understandings of the
possibilities available within seemingly similar situations, to identify
similarities and differences in their relationships with their clients, and to
analyze the patterns they experience in the operation of the law and the legal
system. Because of both the multiplicity of experiences and viewpoints and
the grounding of the discussion in the students' actual cases, case rounds
present an opportunity not only for testing and critiquing the theories of
others from the perspective of the students' own experiences; but for
creating theory from the multiple experiences of the group in the clinic.'"
Although simulations provide an entry point for exploration of domestic
violence theory, as well as the freedom of experimentation that comes when
a real client or case is not at stake, case rounds assure a firmer grounding
to the theoretical discussions by focusing on the students' actual experiences
with their clients. Since no one has made up the situations with which the
student is presented, students cannot discount the material that is discussed
as unrealistic or contrived. Also, the students' experiences with their actual
clients are far richer, more complex and more unpredictable than any
simulation. Thus, the discussions about domestic violence address a far
wider range of factors that affect the situation of a woman who has been
abused than do discussions grounded in simulation. 4 Significantly, because
case rounds occur regularly throughout the clinical experience, the students
can see new information, new issues and new responses emerging over time,
as their relationships with their clients change. The fluidity of the lawyer-
client relationship, therefore, emerges from the development of the
143. See Shalleck, supra note 57, at 144-46 (discussing purposes of group case analysis
meetings).
144. See Shalleck, supra note 64, at 1751; White, Paradox, supra note 64, at 854-55.
145. The complexity and unpredictability of the material presented from actual client
representation creates a challenge for the teacher in case rounds in structuring the discussions.
The relationship between case rounds and the other components of the clinical course can
assist the teacher in organizing and guiding discussion of material that comes in chaotic form.
For example, from supervision, the teacher knows many of the issues that are present in each
student's work and can bring topics to the group that are at that moment compelling for the
students in the clinic. Similarly, the teacher can use case rounds to explore, in light of the
richness and complexity of the students' work with their clients, issues that have been raised
in the classroom component of the course. See Shalleck, supra note 57, at 141-49
(suggesting ways to make the different components of a clinical course interact with each
other in developing issues in the course).
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discussion from week to week. Furthermore, students tend to take case
rounds very seriously. They look to their fellow students for ideas. They
learn to challenge each others' perspectives. They are curious about
differences in approaches and responses that they find when they compare
experiences. When asked to think about the relationship of different
experiences, they struggle with how to conceptualize and make sense of the
experiences they and their fellow students are having. They see how the
task of theory development can be collective, drawing on multiple
understandings of women's experiences of abuse, each one of which can
change from week to week.
In addition, case rounds are a useful forum for addressing the
aspirational aspects of the representational model of women who have been
abused suggested by the theorists of practice. In the group, students can
struggle to find collective ways to deal with the many difficulties that come
with the representation of women who have been abused. Some students
encounter frustration at the unstable, shifting nature of a client's account of
an event. Others become angry or hurt when a client changes her mind
about what she wants to do. Some students want to save the woman from
the danger they perceive to her or to her children and, therefore, often
consciously or unconsciously find ways to impose on her their judgment
about what action to take. Some find the often unpredictable time demands
of the cases distressing due to the disruptions they cause in the students'
attempts to plan work on all of their cases, as well as other parts of their
lives.'46
Student motivations for wanting to represent women who have been
abused do not necessarily produce representation of the type described by
the theorists of practice.'47 Often students seek out representation of women
who have been abused because they want to stop or protect women from
domestic violence. They may or may not understand their motivations for
doing this kind of representation as linked to experiences in their own lives.
Great divergence often exists between the students' images of what it means
to help women who have been abused and women's own understanding of
what they need. Therefore, this representation is often enormously difficult
146. See Bryant & Arias, supra note 14, at 219-20 (describing students who, by failing
to hear and understand their client's fear, spent four days drafting petitions that the client
never came to sign); Espinoza, supra note 14, at 911, 918-23 (presenting in a very moving
and open way the frustrations and challenges created for the students and the supervisor in
the representation of a woman who has been abused); Shalleck, supra note 57, at 153-54; see
also Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street Level
Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGs L.J. 947, 950 (1992) (discussing the desire to "rescue" clients);
Gary Brown et al., Comment, Starting a TRO Project., Student Representation of Battered
Women, 96 YALE L.J. 1985, 2015 (1987) (discussing students' "savior syndrome").
147. See Lopez, supra note 43, at 1609-10 (demonstrating how client domination can
result from a lawyer's desires to achieve a client's best interest).
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in practice, partly because of the frustrations of the legal system, but, far
more commonly, because of frustrations with the clients.
These frustrations and difficulties of working with women who have
been abused can easily lead students to greater acceptance of the dominant
frameworks of the legal system for handling domestic violence.'48 They
may prompt students to see women as victims needing to be protected, even
if the women do not recognize or accept that need. Students may also see
women as failing to understand or appreciate the danger that they or their
children face as explicable within the frameworks of victimization and
powerlessness. The students' discomfort with the client's knowledge of and
approach to her situation, coupled with the students' confidence in a
superior understanding of domestic violence, justifies in the students' minds
imposing their own evaluation of danger, disregarding client wishes, or
pursuing solutions that the client may not want. Experience by itself does
not necessarily encourage students' reflection, empathic and non-judgmental
responses, acceptance of the fluidity of the lawyer-client relationship,
collaborative working relationships with clients, the construction of
responses that fit a client's needs, or comfort with the unpredictability of the
time demands of the representation. Also, neither lawyering theory that
affirms the centrality of the client's perspective, whether it be the traditional
client-centeredness approach or the theoretics of practice approach, nor
feminist critiques of dominant domestic violence theory by themselves
provide students with ways to incorporate into their understanding of
representation of women who have been abused processes for dealing with
the felt difficulty of this work. Exhorting students to realize the aspirational
goals of the model is of little value if we cannot help them in devising ways
to address the conditions that make the characteristics of the model difficult
to achieve.
Therefore, students should have a space to discuss the frustration and
anger that this representation often creates for them. For at least some
students, the collective discussion that occurs in case rounds enables them
to admit to their feelings, to explore their motivations, to identify how the
feelings and motivations affect their representation, and to try to figure out
together ways to handle these aspects of their experience together as they
represent their clients.'49 The group dialogue can give some students a place
148. See Espinoza, supm note 14, at 906-07, 922, 924-26 (presenting an example of
how accepted frameworks for handling domestic violence suppressed recognition of or action
on client's expression of needs). For examples of this phenomenon outside of the context
of domestic violence, see Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty, supra note 64, at 2111-13; Lopez,
supra note 43, at 1609-10.
149. Both Linda Mills and Joan Meier argue strongly for integrating psychology into
the training of lawyers to deal with the issues generated for students by working with women
who have been abused. See Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1243 ("1 am arguing that
advocates for battered women have a responsibility to draw from psychoanalytic theory and
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to explore their own doubts and frustrations with greater distance than in
individual supervision.' When students see their own doubts and problems
reflected in the experiences of others, they may be able to fashion concrete
responses that draw upon the insights of both the feminist critics and the
theorists of practice, or responses that are rooted in their own insights about
the clients' experiences. Dialogue reflecting experiences and insights fosters
the development of an effective model of representation of women who have
been abused because it recognizes that the difficulties of the work are felt
deeply by many who undertake it.
Supervision which addresses directly the actions of the student provides
an additional forum for teaching about domestic violence theory. 5' When
practice to relate to clients affectively .. "); Meier, supra note 14, at 1323-24 (describing
collaborative teaching with a psychologist).
Although these psychological approaches might be useful in some settings and for some
students, other techniques should be developed that are not dependent upon the integration
of psychological theory or personnel into clinics or law practices. While learning from the
insights of psychology, as well as other disciplines such as literature, anthropology and
philosophy, we need to develop forms of practice and forms of education that enable us as
lawyers to explore the multiple dimensions of what it means to represent a woman who has
been abused. The use of theory and practice of another discipline, however, does not
necessarily improve lawyers' ways of thinking or acting. Other disciplines have their
methodological, theoretical, political and practical disputes. When we cross disciplinary
boundaries, we need to do so with the consciousness that we will find contested terrain, as
we do in law. More importantly, in using the methods and practices of other disciplines, we
need to evaluate their effectiveness from the perspective of the work we do in our
representation of clients, even as we use those disciplines to help us challenge the boundaries
of what it means to represent someone. Theorists of practice of all types draw heavily upon
particular aspects of other disciplines in working to create forms of legal thought and practice
that provide space not just for clients to tell their stories within the accepted forms of legal
discourse, but also for clients, in telling their stories, to alter those accepted forms. See, e.g.,
Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty, supra note 64 (using narrative theory); Alfieri, supra note 123
(exploring modem and postmodern attempts to transform the lawyer's work of telling client
stories); BINDER ET AL., supra note 57 (using psychology); Clark D. Cunningham, The
Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse,
77 CORNELL L. REv. 1298 (1992) (using ethnography and literary theory); Miller, supra note
64 (using narrative theory); White, supra note 57 (using anthropology and philosophy).
150. See Goldfarb, supra note 58, at 1667-69 (discussing differences between reflection
upon experiences that occur in groups and between supervisors and students).
151. In another article, I developed an approach to supervision of students in the
clinical setting in which I identified six contexts within which to place the decisions a teacher
makes in supervising students in their work representing clients: (1) Course structure, (2)
Case-Related Experiences, (3) Acting and Learning-The Process of Creating Meaning from
Experience, (4) Relationships Between Students and Their Clients, (5) Differences Among
Students, and (6) The Teacher. See Shalleck, supra note 57, at 140-77.
These contexts are certainly not exhaustive, and others would be valuable in illuminating
considerations to guide a supervisor in making the many choices about teaching students how
to think about a case. Rather, they are illustrative of a process for thinking about
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used in conjunction with the other components of the clinical course,
supervision is critical for many reasons."' The supervising teacher is able
to work with the students on how understandings of domestic violence
suffuse all the details of the work that lawyers do. Since supervision occurs
as students plan for all the actions in a case, recognize and evaluate the
multiple decisions that need to be made, and critique actions after they have
occurred, the teacher can pick multiple moments during the representation
of a client to look with the students at how theories of domestic violence are
operating at all times and as part of all the lawyering activities involved in
the representation.
In addition to examining how differing visions of women who have
been abused take shape in all the details of a case, the teacher can also use
supervision as a place for the student to look at the visions of women who
have been abused that are implicit in the actions of the various participants
in the legal system. Students can examine how domestic violence theory
operates in the actions of a judge, a social worker, a family member, a
prosecutor, or in the institutional structures of the legal system.'53 Some-
times, identifying the operation of these implicit visions in the actions of
others can help students see how their own actions with their client are
affected by their underlying experiences and understandings of domestic
violence.'54 These observations also assist students in figuring out with the
client the choices that the client has about how to present herself in any
supervision. The aim of the article is to encourage teachers to be self-conscious in
identifying the contexts that expose important aspects of teaching about client representation.
In addition to identifying contexts within which to place supervisory decisions, I also explore
three supervisory decisions, which I address in each of the six contexts: (1) the allocation of
responsibility between teacher and student in planning for an initial client interview, (2) the
setting of the educational agenda for each supervisory interaction, and (3) the integration of
institutional analysis and client-based advocacy. Id. I do not analyze in the article decisions
about teaching theories of domestic violence, although the three decisions are all relevant to
the teaching of domestic violence theory. The decision about teaching theory could be
analyzed within the contextual framework presented. The imaginary case I use, both to
identify these multiple contexts for supervisory decision-making and to analyze the choices
available to the teacher in making the three decisions identified in the article, is a case in
which the students are seeking a civil protection order for a woman who has been abused.
The case, therefore, could be a vehicle for exploring the complexities of supervising students
who are representing a woman who has been abused. Id.
152. Id. at 152-67 (discussing relationship of action to the creation of meaning).
153. See Bryant & Arias, supra note 14, at 221 (examining how students can see how
assumptions about abused women are reflected in actions of participants in the legal system);
Shalleck, supra note 57, at 152, 158, 165, 169 (discussing the assumptions about domestic
violence implicit in institutional structures in the legal system).
154. See Bryant & Arias, supra note 14, at 221.
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legal action she chooses to take and the potential consequences for herself
and for the outcome of the legal action of the decisions that she makes.'55
Furthermore, the client herself may be affected by the understandings of
domestic violence that she finds in the legal system and in the rest of her
world. Supervision provides the opportunity to look in detail at a woman's
changing understanding of herself throughout the course of her relationship
with the student. In supervision, the teacher can help the student examine
the multiple ways that the client presents herself, describes what has
happened to her, and discusses what she wants.
156
Additionally, the teacher can use domestic violence theory to help the
student explore the various factors that might affect how the client
approaches the image of herself that she wants to convey to the lawyer, the
stories that she tells of experiences of abuse, and the possibilities for action
that she sees as available to her. Domestic violence theory can help the
teacher frame a broad set of questions to assist the student in attending to
aspects of the client's story that might have been taken for granted or
suppressed.' The teacher can also draw upon that theory in helping the
student be aware of how the details of the student's words, actions and
attitudes affect the client's understanding of herself, her ability to take
action, and her choice of what to do and how to present herself in the
world. 58 In addition to provoking the student to think about these issues,
155. See Miller, supra note 64, at 563-70 (providing a model of how clients can
participate in the creation of case theories that convey visions of themselves that they help
shape); Shalleck, supra note 57, at 157, 168 (identifying issues that the students need to
address with the client in order to take action in the legal system); White, Subordination,
supra note 64 (analyzing how a client's choices about visions of herself that she wanted to
convey to different participants in the legal and social service systems affected the various
stages of the case).
156. See Shalleck, supra note 57, at 156-57, 168.
157. For example, what is the client's self-concept? Does she present herself as a
victim? If she does, why is that happening? Does she see herself as a victim? Have her
interactions with the person who is abusing her made her feel victimized? How do these
interactions fit into other ways that the abuser has made her feel? Has the abuse affected
other parts of her life? Her work? Her relationship with her children? Her relationships
with family and friends? How have her experiences of abuse affected the way that she feels
in other parts of her life? How does she feel about those parts of her life? Have her
previous interactions with the legal system (e.g., police, intake workers, clerks) made her
think that she needs to conform to the stereotype of a victim? Have her encounters with the
social service system produced the same result? Have friends or family members encouraged
her to feel victimized? Have they refused to take seriously the acts of abuse? Have they
held her responsible for the abuse? Have they discouraged her from taking any action? How
does the client understand their attitudes about the abuse she has suffered? In what ways do
their views matter to her? How is abuse viewed in the communities to which she belongs?
How do those views affect her view of herself? Do race, sexual orientation, and class
matter?
158. See, e.g., Bryant & Arias, supra note 14, at 220 (describing supervision in which
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the teacher can help the student, in the planning phase of supervision, to
identify and use lawyering techniques developed in the classroom portion
of the course that put into practice the search for the client's understanding
of herself, undertaken with the knowledge that the lawyer is himself or
herself affecting that understanding. In the critique portion of supervision,
the teacher can guide the student in evaluating how his or her lawyering
helped in appreciating the client's shifting understanding of herself,
including the client in framing choices about how to present herself in the
world, and assisting the client in achieving results that she wanted.
In addition to getting students to see theory in all aspects of their
practice of representing women who have been abused, supervision can be
a place for students to evaluate how their own evolving conceptions of being
a lawyer relate to existing models of lawyering for women who have been
abused. In this process, they can begin to shape their own identities as
lawyers.'59 As students develop an understanding of what it means in terms
of daily practice to provide a particular type of representation, they can
decide if and how they will do this work. Supervision is a place to
question, to reflect upon, and to put into practice each of the aspects of
representing women who have been abused."
When theories have been introduced in the class and common questions
have been addressed in case rounds, supervision is the place for students to
confront in detail what representing an abused woman requires. For
students hesitant to talk much in case rounds, supervision provides a setting
in which to express their doubts and frustrations with the work. Supervision
allows students to explore their motivations and critically examine their
attitudes, not just abstractly, but in the framework of a particular client with
particular needs. In addition, supervision provides a space for students to
talk about their own experiences with and feelings about abuse.'
Sometimes that discussion may be sparked by the particular demands of a
case. In other situations, the regularity and openness of the supervisory
dialogue can provide a safe space for a student to talk, outside of the
confines of any particular case, about their own lives and experiences, and
the effect of their own histories and attitudes on their approach to the
representation of women who have been abused.
students see how the choices presented to the client about how to deal with the danger posed
by her husband overwhelmed her, causing her to withdraw); Espinoza, supm note 14, at 919-
23 (describing supervision in which a client's desire to reconcile with her husband was
suppressed by both student and teacher who did not pursue a disfavored client narrative);
Meier, supra note 14, at 1336 (describing supervision in which students see how, by
misinterpreting a question from a client, they respond in a way that misreads what the client
wants and perhaps sends a message that deters her from further use of the legal system).
159. See Shalleck, supra note 57, at 167, 169-70.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 153, 176.
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Moreover, supervision is critical to the understanding and development
of domestic violence theory because in the actual work with clients students
must take responsibility for the actions that they take. Each choice that a
student makes has consequences for a client and the student must live with
the uncertainties contained in the choices made in the course of representa-
tion.162 Anticipating consequences in planning and evaluating those
consequences in critique force a student to come to terms with the meaning
of theories of domestic violence at multiple levels. If students plan an
interview with a client, try, in light of the planning, to listen carefully to the
client, and attempt to understand the danger the client feels before drafting
court papers seeking relief, only to have the client withdraw from the
representation by missing the appointment to sign the papers because she
feared confronting her husband in court, the students can, in supervision, try
to discover where and why they went wrong.' 63 They can question them-
selves. Why, when they heard her sense of danger, did they think that court
orders would alleviate her sense of danger? Did they jump to a legal course
of action because of the dominance of legal frameworks for addressing
domestic violence? Did the students' own attitudes about the danger and the
effectiveness of court remedies shape the options that they presented to her?
Were their skills at listening not well enough developed to hear the
complexity of the message about danger that the client conveyed? If the
students heard the message as it was conveyed by the client at the time of
the interview and presented multiple options in terms of the client's needs,
did the client not really understand what going to court meant, in terms of
danger to herself or her children, until she had the concrete option presented
to her? Was the client unable to communicate her shifting thoughts about
that option in the course of the interview? Was she embarrassed about
conveying later doubts to the students directly?
When the students find that their efforts were misdirected, even after
spending many hours drafting the papers and putting their energy and
commitment into their work, they must confront in a powerful way the
consequences of their misreading of the client. By exploring in supervision
the multiple possibilities behind the client's withdrawal from the students,
the students are examining what domestic violence theory means in practice.
In addition, the students are developing ways to attempt to improve their
legal practice in the future.
162. See Amsterdam, supra note 129, at 616-17 (describing the power of the decision-
making aspect of lawyering); see also Shalleck, supra note 57, at 163-67 (analyzing the role
of responsibility for consequences in student learning from action).
163. This scenario is presented in Bryant & Arias, supra note 14, at 219-20.
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C. Responsibility, Reflection and Learning
The responsibility of the students for the actions they take in represent-
ing women who have been abused raises important questions about student
representation of women who have been abused."M Students will make
errors in their representation of women who have been abused. Clinical
teachers, through careful attention to each of the structural components of
their clinical courses and the development of multiple educational techniques
used in different settings, can minimize student errors. Through readings,
simulations, journals, and case rounds combined with supervision of the
students' actions in a case, teachers can help students identify and realize the
highest levels of practice available to them at their stage of development.
Teachers can develop techniques for identifying and helping students figure
out ways to correct, to the extent possible, errors that they make. Teachers
164. Linda Mills, in reviewing the literature on law school clinical programs that
provide representation to abused women, is deeply troubled by student errors in representing
abused women. Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1240-41. She notes that the materials from
a hypothetical case presenting portions of two students' representation of an abused woman
from my article Clinical Contexts: Theory and Practice in Law and Supervision, supra note
60, partly motivated her to write her article because of the students' mistakes presented in
those materials. Mills, however, seems to be confused about the status of the materials,
thinking they are from an actual case. The case presented was not an actual case from the
Women and the Law Clinic at American University, or any other clinic, and is clearly
identified as imaginary. The case was, in fact, jointly conceived and drafted by a group of
clinical teachers and a judge from Washington, D.C. who were creating a presentation for
a Judicial Conference on the topic of clinical education. Shalleck, supra note 57, at 111-12
n.6.
To present the difficult issues posed by supervision of students in clinical programs, the
materials intentionally present multiple student mistakes in representation, mistakes which
the group found to be illustrative of the type of errors students from many different programs
commonly make. Similarly, the small portions of a hypothetical supervisory dialogue
presented in the materials are identified clearly as a "heuristic device," and not as an "ideal"
or "typical" supervision. Id. at 112. The supervisory dialogue was meant to present
important supervisory decisions, some of which are explored in the body of the article. The
aim of the article was to suggest a contextual framework for analyzing and evaluating the
multiple decisions made by supervisors.
I included the Jessica Green case hypothetical in the article to provide a concrete
example of the types of choices faced by teachers in their day-to-day work supervising
students in order to ground the discussion of supervision in the realities of teaching students.
The case was meant to avoid the dangers inherent in creating abstract aspirational models not
rooted in the complicated demands of the actual work of teaching students to represent
clients. Only at the end of a detailed examination of some of the issues raised by the Green
case does the article present a "vision" of supervision that emerges from the analysis of
supervisory action, one that relies on "a complex and constantly shifting scheme requiring
the teacher's constant attention to the fundamental assumptions underlying each choice that
she [the supervisor] makes." Id. at 178-79.
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can also ensure, through various forms of intervention in student work with
a client, that students do not fall below a minimal level of practice. Addi-
tionally, teachers can emphasize the importance of reflection on the students'
own experiences, as well as on their experiences in representing their clients,
both the successes and the failures, so that the students can learn valuable
lessons from the actions that they take. However thorough and well-
designed a clinical course may be, mistakes are inevitable.
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Several aspects of student mistakes are important to analyze, however,
if we are to understand the problems that are a part of representing women
who have been abused. Given the contested nature of theories of domestic
violence, it is not clear what constitutes an error. Actions that might appear
harmful from the perspective of the feminist critics and the theorists of
practice might appear justified when viewed in the light of currently
prevailing domestic violence theory.'66 For example, encouraging a woman
to seek a protection order when she is uncertain and confused would be
viewed differently under differing frameworks. The task of the supervisor
in the clinical setting is to help the students recognize the importance of
evaluating this form of client counseling from the perspective of the client.
Even this evaluative project, however, is plagued by difficulty. How
does the student know the client's perspective? In certain circumstances the
client may clearly convey that she has been harmed or helped by the
student's approach to counseling. Far more commonly, however, the student
will have limited and partial understanding about how the client evaluates
his or her approach to decision-making. The student's reflection on the
process of counseling the woman who has been abused can usually produce
only tentative and uncertain conclusions. These partial thoughts, although
they may not produce certain judgments about the appropriateness of the
action taken, are important for two other reasons. First, a student begins a
process of ongoing reflection and re-evaluation of work with women who
have been abused. This thought provoking process, perhaps more than any
particular judgment about an action being right or wrong, begins the process
165. All the accounts of clinical practice describe the misreadings and misjudgments
that students make in representing women who are abused. See, e.g., Bryant & Arias, supra
note 14, at 219-21; Espinoza, supra note 14, at 918-23; Meier, supra note 14, at 1336-37;
Shalleck, supra note 57.
166. Linda Mills suggests that the students in the fictional Jessica Green case would
have done a better job if they had more information on the "unique situation of battered
women or the diversity of their reactions to violence." Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 124 1.
Even assuming that the students would have been able to translate this knowledge into action,
given the state of our knowledge about "battered women," would the students necessarily
have benefitted from a review of the literature? Particularly at the moment in history when
the simulation was created, 1987, the critiques presented in Parts I and II of this article did
not exist. The theories about domestic violence that were available then would more likely
have supported than challenged the students' focus upon legal remedies.
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of understanding domestic violence. 67  Second, theory comes from this
process of reflection, even if that theory itself is unstable and changing. 1
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Additionally, greater and greater levels of preparation prior to-action
with clients may not make the students better at their actual representation.
Clinical teachers constantly experiment with different ways to prepare
students for the process of representing women who have been abused.
Through simulations, readings, reflection on the students' motivations,
expectations and experiences, and supervisory planning sessions prior to
actions in cases, clinical teachers work to produce the highest quality of
representation possible within the context of the clinical program.1 69 The
essence of clinical methodology, however, is that lessons are often not fully
learned until the student deals with an actual situation."' 0 The interaction
between the analysis before the action, the action itself, and the reflection
following the action produces knowledge about representing women who
have been abused that is not possible solely in the preparatory phase.
Through action, students do not simply apply what they have been taught
167. See Shalleck, supra note 57, at 167.
168. See White, Paradox, supra note 64, at 854-55.
169. See David F. Chavkin, Am- I My Client's Lawyer?: Reconceptualizing the
Supervisor-Student-Client Relationship (presented at the Clinical Theory Workshop, New
York Law School, September 19, 1997).
170. See Shalleck, supra note 57, at 153-58 (discussing the relationship of action to
meaning). Linda Mills asserts that the fictional students in the Jessica Green case would
have done a better job if they had a supervisory meeting prior to their interview with Jessica
Green. She assumes, without any basis in the text, that they had not been through "extensive
classroom and individual training sessions." Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1242. In the
hypothetical situation, the students had, in fact, gone through classes, case rounds,
observation of the domestic violence court, and representation of other clients who had been
abused. Perhaps a supervisory meeting prior to each interview with a woman who has been
abused would be useful. Clinical teachers are always searching for a useful balance between
analysis prior to action, action itself and reflection following action. It may be the case that
with some students, in some situations, increasing amounts of discussion prior to action does
little to improve the quality of action. Deciding whether to have a supervisory meeting prior
to a particular client interview depends upon the analysis of that decision in light of the
multiple contexts within which the teacher views the decision. For instance, what have the
students experienced already in the other components of the course? Shalleck, supra note
57, at 141-42, 144, 146-49, 149-52. How is action important in the students' learning about
interviewing a woman who has been abused? Id. at 153-55. What are the most important
messages to convey to the students about their relationship with Jessica Green and what are
the different ways to convey those messages other than meetings prior to initial interviews?
Id. at 167-71. What are the particular strengths and weaknesses of these particular students?
Id. at 175-77. How does the teacher's own views of the case influence her choice of where
to devote time? Id. at 177. In light of this type of analysis, the teacher can evaluate whether
the students have had enough prior work to approach a first interview without an initial
supervisory dialogue.
1997] 1061
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
before, but learn the material differently.'71 Students may only truly learn
about women who have been abused when they have had experience with
them, experience subjected to analysis and reflection both before and after
the action.
Finally, although students will make errors representing women who
have been abused, so will experienced lawyers.'72 The experience level of
a lawyer is not a good indicator of how well the lawyer will conform to the
aspects of lawyering identified by the theorists of practice. If, however,
experience is one factor that, when combined with many other aspects of
good lawyering practices, will produce better representation for women who
have been abused, can we ever justify representation by law students who,
by definition, do not have experience? Putting aside the problem that few
skilled, experienced lawyers exist who provide representation for women
who have been abused, we have the responsibility as clinical teachers to
develop the best lawyers for women who have been abused that our
educational practices permit. We must proceed, however, with the under-
standing that we have no more certainty about our educational practices than
we do about our theories of domestic violence. Here, as elsewhere, we have
only our tentative, partial understandings that develop and change over time.
IV. CONCLUSION: CREATING THEORY FROM TEACHING
Feminist critiques of the increasingly dominant forms of domestic
violence theory, as well as the creation of models of representing women
who have been abused, have together made fundamental contributions to
challenging the increasingly strong legal paradigm for addressing domestic
violence in our society. They have raised critical questions about whether
this paradigm helps women who have been abused deal with the abuse in
their lives. The experience of teaching students to provide representation to
women who have been abused can make a further important contribution to
this project of reconstructing domestic violence theory from the perspective
of the women themselves.
From clinical practice, we can start to define characteristics of legal
practice for women who have been abused. This practice (a) promotes
awareness of the multiple visions of the client that are operating throughout
her experience in the legal system; (b) attends to the consequences of any
vision that is unselfconsciously or self-consciously adopted by lawyer and
171. See Shalleck, supra note 57, at 153.
172. Linda Mills, in assessing the errors of the fictional students presented in the
Jessica Green scenario, asserts that these errors "might have been remedied by a more
experienced lawyer, given the nature of the judge hearing the proceeding. Should not a
battered woman, though, whose very life may depend on her lawyer's persuasiveness, skill,
and understanding of institutional practices be represented by no one less than the best?"
Mills, Silence, supra note 14, at 1240 n.68.
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client; (c) enables a client to convey, in the forums she chooses and to the
extent she wishes, the vision of herself that she decides, after consultation
with her lawyer, to project; (d) recognizes that the interaction between
lawyer and client plays a part in shaping the client's understanding of her
needs and her experience; (e) enables the client to make informed decisions
about the multiple consequences of the visions of herself conveyed through
the legal proceeding; and (f) assists a client in understanding the possibilities
that she has within her situation to make changes that are meaningful to her
and in taking those actions that she decides are desirable.
Also, by looking at how the feminist theories operate in the day-to-day
practice of lawyers working with women who have been abused, and by
viewing the aspirational elements of the theorists of practice in the
framework of the actual project of teaching students a contextualized
practice designed for women who have been abused, clinical experience has
the potential to ground domestic violence theory in a recognition of both the
profound challenges and deep importance of developing a contextualized
understanding of the lawyer-client relationship. When engaged in this sort
of relationship, each woman can contribute in some small way to the
creation of a new legal paradigm concerning domestic violence.
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